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Abstract
Top military leadership has identified problems with the timeliness and
effectiveness of DoD contingency construction support. Qualitative data was collected in order
to gain clarity on the problem space and lay a foundation for solution generation and selection.
Interviews were conducted with agents with experience within the Iraq and Afghanistan theater
of operation as well as support functions for the Pentagon. Commanders, Engineers, Lawyers,
Acquisition Attorneys, Staff Officers and Program Managers have been interviewed. The
interviews have been analyzed using open coding to answer research question and identify to
emergent themes and concepts.

The data collected has revealed that Contingency Construction Authority is technically
meeting its intent for projects programmed through CCA, but not for large-scale infrastructure
that have circumvented the CCA process. Additionally, the CCA process is not meeting the
expectation of the war fighters. Furthermore, because it is not meeting the war fighter’s
expectation the system is being manipulated in order to, “accomplish the mission” which is
creating unintended adverse consequences with regard to cost, health, safety, force protection,
Anti-Deficiency Act violations, mission support and safety. Significant negative consequences
were found to be attributed to the interpretation of the term “temporary construction” and the
time required to process CCA projects. To provide further insight and to assist with analysis, a
value stream map was created in order to map the contingency construction approval and funding
process. This research effort has provided clarity of the problem space of contingency
construction and prepared a foundation for future research to address the problem.
iv
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CCA: EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY OF CONSTRUCTION
IN A CONTINGENCY ENVIRONMENT

I. Introduction
Contingency construction is an operational necessity and often requires Military
Construction (MILCON) level funding, particularly for large infrastructure projects.
Contingency construction can be defined as unforeseen or unplanned construction requirements
related to military operations such as combat, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief efforts.
This paper looks specifically at combat operations. Military Construction project planning and
programming rules have evolved over the decades through congressional legislation and they
provide the means by which installations acquire the resources and authority necessary to
provide major facilities to support the Air Force missions in a peacetime and wartime
environments. Military Construction projects generally take about 5 years to complete, from
project identification to completion (Mathews, 2006). Due to the urgency and uncertainty of
facility requirements in a contingency environment, Congress developed Contingency
Construction Authority (CCA) to meet operational requirements. Contingency Construction
Authority gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to carry out a military construction project
not otherwise authorized by law, if deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military
Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest.
If the Secretary of Defense deicide to exercise this authority, he/she will submit a report to the
appropriate committee with the justification for the project and a cost estimate. Construction
may commence as early as seven days after electronic notification to the committee (or 14 days
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if in hardcopy form) (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007). Despite the expedited CCA process,
facility construction is often slow and constrains wartime operations (Belasco & Else, 2005).
The focus of this thesis effort is to explore the intent of the CCA process and compare that intent
with current CCA use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
General David Petraeus, upon departure from command of Multi-National Force-Iraq,
recommended legislative, programming, and regulatory reform to improve the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) ability to operate in combat and contingency operations. This recommendation
was specifically targeted to reduce the time from requirement identification to construction and
to provide flexibility in contingency operations. His concerns were echoed by Deputy Secretary
of Defense William Lynn. Secretary Lynn stated that the current legal constraints limit U.S.
forces’ ability to use funds, which hinders effectiveness, as personnel may not be well equipped
or prepared to avail themselves of the complex waivers and reviews provided for in the
acquisition system. Furthermore, the rapid identification of requirements in a contingency
environment should be followed by an equally rapid resourcing and equipping response to yield
substantial improvements in our ability to conduct operations. In order to address these issues
the DoD will require sustained engagement with Congress (Lynn, 2009).
This chapter will introduce the research performed which was segregated into the below
list of eight topics.
1. Motivational Anecdotal Evidence
2. Background
3. Research Questions/Objectives
4. Conceptual Framework
5. Methodology
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6. Scope and Limitations
7. Implications
8. Thesis Organization

Motivational Anecdotal Evidence
While in Iraq, I observed the problems of CCA first hand. Air Force Civil Engineers
have been responsible for validating projects and executing the project programming process for
the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB), Joint Facility Utilization Board (JFUB), MILCON,
and CCA projects. I, along with a number of colleagues, have witnessed several problems
executing the CCA process. After I arrived in theater, I familiarized myself with the Army’s
processes and regulations surrounding facility and infrastructure planning and programming
requirements, which are similar to the AF process and regulations. Contingency Construction
Authority projects generally took a minimum of nine months to approve. This time span was
particularly problematic while programming projects needed to beddown surge forces in Iraq
were deployed. As one would expect, the surge of more than 20,000 troops required several
large-scale projects that exceeded the $750,000 MILCON statutory threshold; projects costing
more than the threshold require formal congressional review and approval thru the MILCON
process or potentially thru the CCA process. Due to the lengthy CCA process (Belasco & Else,
2005), leadership across theater encouraged staffs to pursue alternative programming avenues to
facilitate the attainment facilities required to meet mission timelines. This seeking out of
alternative programming avenues had a significant impact on project cost, schedule and
performance. Although looking for legitimate alternative funding avenues for projects is a
common practice for programmers, a gray area exists as a programmer moves toward project
splitting. Often practices such as blatant project splitting are of great concern AF civil engineers,
3

because it deviates from the original project acquisition process. Theoretically, CCA only
requires congressional notification, while approval can occur in as few as seven days after
notification (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007).
Additionally, I witnessed the circumventing of procedures which frequently resulted in
projects that did not adequately support the mission, did not comply with regulations, and
endangered lives. Project splitting occurs when a projects is split into smaller less costly projects
in order to get costs under the statutory thresholds of MILCON. This often lowers the approval
authority and shortens the project programming time. This results in less oversight by outside
agencies and higher headquarters. Often, outside agencies slows down the project acquisition
process. Project splitting is a strategy used in response to slower funding avenues such as CCA
and MILCON.
For example, a project was submitted to an AF civil engineer from a subordinate
command for validation. The project was an Overhead Cover (OHC) project to protect living
quarters. Headquarters’ engineers and programmers are often familiar with the Engineer
Research and Development Center’s (ERDC) approved design that was ubiquitous and
successful throughout the theater. The design consisted of a pre-detonation layer with a
fragmentation catch layer about five meters below (as illustrated below). The design also was
robust enough to prevent progressive collapse. (Roth & ect, 2007) The project submitted
consisted of a pre-detonation layer only with no account for progressive collapse. This design
would likely increase the fragmentation effect on the occupants and possibly crush the remaining
injured and uninjured occupancy if the Indirect Fire (IDF) struck a critical node in the structure.
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Figure 1: Overhead Cover Example

Correct

Incorrect

The subordinate command was directed to ERDC, but the unit refused to engage with
ERDC’s designers. Ultimately, the subordinate commander confessed that the structure was
already constructed and the funds were required to pay the contractor. The subordinate
command knew the project would require MILCON or CCA funds. Because of the slow and
dysfunctional programming process, they felt it paramount to get the project completed as soon
as possible, by any means possible to protect their troops. For this reason, the subordinate
commander split the project into multiple OHC structures “protecting” each small individual
billeting structure. In the subordinate commander’s mind, this lowers the approval authority to
the base commander. Unfortunately, no engineering expertise existed at or below that level of
approval authority. While there are several motivational and ethical dilemmas at play here, the
crux is likely the dysfunctional project programming process.
The example discussed above is only an indication of the many different practices that
take place in a contingency environment. According to various AF civil engineers, many of
these practices stemmed from the dysfunctional funding process.

Background
Congressional legislation and DoD fiscal regulations have evolved over time in order to
direct the planning and programming process of construction projects, both in times of peace and
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war. Once a mission requirement is identified, engineers or contractors design the appropriate
project in order to meet the requirement (Department of the Air Force, 2003). The scope of a
particular construction project alludes to the complexity of specification, cost and time that is
inherent in a project of that magnitude. To determine the scope of a project, a project
programmer will obtain a cost estimate by either performing a cost estimate or by acquiring cost
estimates from contractors. After acquiring a cost estimate, the appropriate funding avenues are
identified based on projected cost and type of project. In a contingency environment, mission
requirements frequently have critical time lines and are the most heavily weighted variable (time)
in the project planning and programming decision-making process. After the facility
requirement and associated timeline have been established, the project is usually modified in
order to meet the requirements of the regulatory and legal funding avenue (Department of the Air
Force, 2003).

Research Questions/Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to capture the intent of the governing fiscal regulations and
qualitatively explore the effectiveness of the regulation’s intent. This research also seeks to
capture the unintended effects of the regulations on the cradle to grave process of mission
requirement identification, project programming, design, construction, use, and any other
emergent issues that were revealed during this effort. The specific questions addressed are as
follows:
1. What is the intent of CCA?
2. How is CCA being executed?
3. What are the unintended consequences of the CCA process?
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Question 1 is answered during the literature review and confirmed during the interview process.
Questions 2 and 3 rely more heavily on the interview process.

Scope and Limitations
This case study is bounded within the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations with
the exception of participants functioning at the Pentagon involved with theater operation. The
vertical range of command ranges from Air Staff personnel to project engineers. The breadth of
this study ranges across functional areas to include Commanders, Engineers, Lawyers,
Acquisition Attorneys, Staff Officers and Program Managers. This exploratory qualitative case
study represents the ideas and experiences of the participants interviewed. For this reason, I
sought participates from a variety of career fields, services, ranks and level of command in order
to solicit a comprehensive and diverse response. Often, there was a large time gap between
many of the respondents interviews and their contingently experience. Therefore, participants
experiences are less vivid in their memory, than during or immediately after there experience.
Additionally, participant experience with procedures and process varied by location and time.
This effort does not seek to provide a solution, but merely document the challenges and
successes associated with the existing regulatory structure.

Implications
Academic Contribution
This effort seeks to contribute to the academic literature associated with creating policy
for organizations; such fields include organizational behavior, systems analysis, knowledge
management, business process improvement and so forth. Specifically, the processes which
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organizations undertake to govern operations, control cost and meet legal requirements in
various environments. Additionally, this research aims to expand the application of structuration
and adaptive structuration to organizational behavior.

DoD Contribution
The goal of this research is to have positive influence on the means by which the DoD
executes contingency construction in direct support of operations in a combat environment.
More specifically, this effort seeks to increase the effectiveness of planning and programming of
MILCON and CCA projects and to increase clarity of the CCA process.

Summary
Congress established CCA to enable the Secretary of Defense to execute military
construction in a contingency environment due to the urgent nature of expeditionary military
operations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the DoD is not using CCA as expeditiously and
extensively as Congress intended. In addition to deviation from regulations, anecdotal evidence
indicates consequences associated with these deviations may not have been considered when the
regulatory structure was established to guide the CCA process. The United States has spent a
significant amount of funds on contingency construction in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cost
continues to grow at an astounding rate. In the FY2005 Supplemental, DoD requested $1.0
billion for military construction to support Afghanistan and Iraq either in-country or in
surrounding countries. That amount compares to the $912 million in total funding for military
construction for those purposes in previous supplementals since the 9/11 attacks (Belasco & Else,
2005). In the FY 2007 Supplemental, DoD received an additional $1.7 billion for military
construction, almost doubling the previous peak in FY 2005 (Belasco, 2008). For this reason,
this thesis seeks to document the challenges associated with executing contingency construction
8

within the existing regulatory structure. In doing so, establishing a foundation by which further
research can be conducted to correct deficiencies, if found. The theoretical framework draws
upon the theories of structuration and adaptive structuration to provide a lens by which
organizational behavior of the complex bureaucratic structure of the DoD can be analyzed, which
will be explained in depth later in this paper. I used a qualitative methodology to gain insight
into CCA’s intent and practice. This methodology was chosen because of its’ strengths with
regard to the richness of data gained from interviews with germane respondents (McCracken,
1988). However, the limitation of this methodology is that the data collected only represent the
ideas and experiences of the respondents interviewed. The implication of this thesis effort is
intended to give insight to the DoD and academic body literature associated with creating policy
for organizations.

Thesis Organization
Chapter two will present a review of the literature surrounding CCA. The current
existing literature consists of regulations & instructions or documented anecdotal evidence.
Chapter three describes the methodology used to qualitatively explore contingency construction.
Chapter four outlines results of the qualitative data collection and the analysis of data by means
of open coding, as defined in qualitative literature. Chapter five provides a discussion and
conclusion of the research and gives recommendations for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter examines the literature surrounding the advent and use of CCA as well as
the underlying theory used to explain the impact of the MILCON and CCA regulatory structure
on programmers and decision makers in contingency environments. This chapter serves as a
foundation for developing the research protocol that follows in Chapter three. This study was
guided by the research questions presented in Chapter one.
Limited literature exists that evaluates the CCA process from the prospective of intent,
functionality and residual consequences of that functionality. The United States Code and
Service specific regulations provide a window into the intended procedures that provided the
means to conduct military construction to support the defense of our nation, but little procedural
literature exists beyond that. Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports have documented
some of the contentious issues that may affect the CCA process, as well as, many of the costs
associated with contingency operations. All these resources help to contextualize the research
questions. Some of these resources provide insight into possible answers to the research
questions posed and some will allude to gaps in the literature, providing further justification for
this study. More specifically United States Code, DoD and Service specific regulations provide
a foundation to answer the question, “what is the intent of CCA?” (Question #1) CRS reports
give some account of how DoD executes CCA and the challenges and consequences that face
military leadership in executing contingency construction. In doing so, CRS reports provide
some answers to “how CCA is being executed?” and “what are the unintended consequences of
the CCA process?” (Question #2 & #3)
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Finally, a review of Structuration Theory and Adaptive Structuration Theory provides a
conceptual framework to further clarify the organization behavior that affects contingency
construction in the DoD and serve as a foundation for developing the research protocol that
follows in Chapter three. Before looking at how the MILCON and CCA process came to be, it is
useful to review the three questions driving this research effort.

Research Questions
The purpose of this thesis is to capture the intent of the governing fiscal regulations,
qualitatively explore the effectiveness of the regulation’s intent and the impact of the regulatory
structure on programmers and decision makers in contingency environments. This research also
seeks to capture the unintended effects of the regulations on the cradle to grave process of
mission requirement identification, project programming, design, construction, use and any other
issues that were revealed during this effort. The specific research questions are as follows:
1. What is the intent of CCA?
2. How is CCA being executed?
3. What are the unintended consequences of the CCA process?
Question 1 is answered during the literature review and confirmed during the interview process.
Questions 2 and 3 rely more heavily on the interview process.

Question One
“What is the intent of CCA?”
On July 12, 1982 the 97th Congress signed CCA into law under Public Law 97-214, Stat.
155 (U.S. 97th Congress, 1982). Public Law and Regulations certainly allude to the intent of the
CCA process, but determining the expected consequences may be more difficult. Literature that
11

reveals the intent resides in the documentation of the legislative process. The literature explored
in support of question one will lay a foundation of comparison for question two and three. There
is limited published literature outlining the current use of the CCA funding process. The Army,
documenting a Judge Advocate’s (JA) experience with the use of CCA and contingency
construction, published a qualitative article (Hughes, 2005). Additionally, the CRS has
documented historical CCA spending and legislative decisions on the contingency construction
issue, which will be articulated throughout this section.
United States (U.S.) Code and Air Force regulations offer some insight into how our
nation’s military leaders are expected to execute military construction in a contingency
environment. United States Code provideds three provisions to guide such contingency
construction: Title 10 United States Code Section 2803, 2804, 2808.
Title 10 United States Code Section 2803: Emergency Construction authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to
carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the Secretary
determines that the project is vital to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or
the quality of the environment and that the requirement for the project is so urgent that deferral
of the project for inclusion in to the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be
inconsistent with national security of the protection of health, safety, or environment quality, as
the case may be. The maximum amount that the Secretary concerned may obligate in any fiscal
year under this section is $50 million. A project carried out under this section shall be carried
out within the total amount of funds appropriated for military construction that have not been
obligated (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007).
Title 10 United States Code Section 2804: Contingency Construction authorization gives
the Secretary of Defense the authority to carry out a military construction project not otherwise
authorized by law, if deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction
Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest. If the
Secretary of Defense decides to exercise this authority, the DoD will submit a report to the
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committee with the justification for the project and a cost estimate. Construction may commence
as early as seven days after electronic notification to the committee (or 14 days if in hardcopy
form) (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007).
Title 10 United States Code Section 2808: Construction authority in the event of a
declaration of war or national emergency is similar to CCA, in that the Secretary of Defense
“may undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law, that are
necessary to support such use of the armed forces.” Again a similar report must be submitted to
the appropriate congressional committee, but this authorization goes on to say that “such projects
may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military
construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated”
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2007).
The common thread among these three U.S. Codes is that the Secretary of Defense has
the authority to execute construction, if deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military
Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest
Not only does U.S. Codes make allowances for expedited construction in a contingency
environment, but current governmental leadership, such as the honorable Senator Carl Levin,
continues to advocate for such policy. In Senator Levin’s review of the S.3001 - National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, he advocated to continue the powers granted
under CCA and MILCON by stating “Section 1616 of the National Defense Authorization Act
would limit the availability of funds for various large scale infrastructure projects in Iraq and
appears to apply to military construction projects, including projects to support our forces under
the Contingency Construction Authority. If this interpretation is correct, this provision places at
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risk those projects for operations and force protection” (Levin, 2008). The comment by Senator
Levin reinforces the intent of CCA as described in U.S Code.
In addition to U.S. Codes, Air Force instruction (AFI) 32-1021 5.2.3 and 32-1021 5.2.4
provide references to Contingency Construction (CCA,10 U.S.C. 2804) and Construction
Authority in the Event of Declaration of War or National Emergency (10 U.S.C. 2808) by
enabling an expedited approval process in a contingency environment. However, the “use of this
authority is rare and requires a determination that the project is so urgent that use of other
authorities is inconsistent with national security.” Furthermore, “The Secretary of Defense may
authorize the services to undertake military construction projects not otherwise authorized by law.
The Air Force may undertake these projects only within the amount of funds appropriated. The
Secretary of Defense will provide guidance at the time this authority is needed” (Department of
the Air Force, 2003).
Although Congress granted the authority to undertake construction in support of
contingency operation the same emphasis was not placed on the funding of contingency
construction. Hughes, an Army JA expresses his view of the funding process by stating that
Congress has used its power of the purse to create an extensive body of fiscal law to control
military spending, and thereby check executive powers. Before undertaking any mission, a
commander must have express legal authority for each expenditure of public funds. An official
who obligates funds for an improper purpose or with the wrong “color of money” will therefore
be culpable because Congress has not appropriated any amount at all for that purpose. Failure to
observe these requirements may result in a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), which
requires an immediate report to the President and Congress (2005).
Based on this literature, there is an indication that significant emphases has been placed
on the control of funds and understandably so due to the magnitude of funds required for such
military construction. The CRS has evaluated the use of MILCON and CCA funding in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The report quotation below outline the magnitude of funds being dedicated to
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contingency construction and highlights the fact that contingency construction costs are growing
at a rapid rate. For this reason, it is sensible to say that it would be prudent for the DoD to ensure
funds are being used efficiently, as such, this is the motivation and catalyst for this research.
In the FY2005 Supplemental, DOD is requesting $1.0 billion for military construction to
support Afghanistan and Iraq either in-country or in surrounding countries. That amount
compares to the $912 million in funding for military construction for those purposes in previous
supplementals since the 9/11 attacks (2001-2004)” (Belasco & Else, 2005). In the FY 2007
Supplemental, DoD received an additional $1.7 billion for military construction, almost doubling
the previous peak in FY 2005 (Belasco, 2008). In FY 2008, DoD received an additional $2.7
billion for war-related military construction (Belasco, 2008).

United State Code, governmental leadership and service regulations have provided some
insight into the intent of the CCA process. Furthermore, CRS has outlined the magnitude of
funds the United States has dedicated to such projects, highlighting the importance of such
legislation. Major Brian Hughes, an Army JA, gives further insight into the process as he
recognizes that
Congress created the three-tiered system of MILCON, Unspecified, Minor Military
Constriction (UMMC), and O&M funding in 1982. During peacetime Congress provided close
oversight, maintaining the existing Cold War military infrastructure while delivering pork barrel
spending to their districts. While the system worked reasonably well under normal
circumstances, during contingencies the system was cumbersome and slow. Even Congress
recognized that the lack of a dedicated source of funding for contingency construction needs [and
this]… can impede timely response to urgent requirements of armed conflicts” (Hughes, 2005).

After reviewing the literature surrounding CCA, it is clear that Congress has intended to
provide the Secretary of Defense the flexibility to expedite contingency construction operation to
insure that military actions are consistent with national security or national interest. However, it
is equally clear that Congress requires the DoD to remain within previously approved budgets
authorization for military construction, which were based on deferent needs. This need has
arisen because of the fiscal controls that have been placed on such endeavors due to the amount
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of funds being spent. This intent is further substantiated by a CRS report documenting the
practice of CCA, noting, “Congress has also provided DoD with additional flexibility to initiate
military construction projects without advance authorization in order for DoD to move more
quickly to meet wartime needs” (Belasco & Else, 2005). It is now logical to compare the intent
of CCA with the actual practice and look for deviation.

Question Two
“How is CCA being executed?”
The second question driving this research is how the DoD is using CCA. To gain an
understanding of the practitioner’s execution of CCA, we look again at Hughes work along with
CRS reports. In addition to these historical accounts, this research intends to gather more clarity
on this question through interviews with current practitioners.
In order to understand how CCA is being used it is useful to become familiar with the
programming processes that surround CCA. I did this by looking at several integral players in
the programming process. Judge Advocates work closely with commanders in the field to help
them navigate through fiscal law in acquiring authority to conduct their missions. Major Brian A.
Hughes documented his observations noting, “Commanders in the field often chafe at fiscal laws,
especially when a mission imperative requires military construction. Fiscal law requires
MILCON dollars, but a commander often only has O&M funds available. To meet the
commanders’ intent, JAs may be tempted to skirt the fiscal law issue by creating an imaginative
solution that would permit O&M funding. Rather than giving into temptation, however, a JA
should firmly resist engaging in any subterfuge” (Hughes, 2005). The existence of a need to
develop “imaginative solution(s)” to meet wartime “mission imperatives” to which Major
Hughes refers is another key motivation for this research effort.
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A CRS report has documented the practice of CCA noting “Congress has also provided
DoD with additional flexibility to initiate military construction projects without advance
authorization in order for DoD to move more quickly to meet wartime needs. At the same time,
the committees have voiced concerns about insufficient or lack of information from DoD about
the use of funds for construction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan and whether all projects
requested qualify as emergency spending” (Belasco & Else, 2005). Contingency Construction
Authority has provided the authority to use funds in a timely manner, but if the funds are
distributed from the annual supplemental funds once a year, the funding process may negate the
flexibility and timeliness provided by CCA.
Adding to the confusion of contingency project programming is the definition of
permanent structures and project qualifications for emergency contingency construction funding.
The consternation may reside in the conflict between the simple pay back period calculations in
the economic analysis and the uncertainty associated with contingency operations.
Recent congressional action amplified in H.R.1268, the FY2005 Supplemental, suggests
that DoD’s plans for military construction in and around Iraq and Afghanistan are of
considerable concern. The House version of H.R. 1268 cuts funding for one overseas project in
Afghanistan stating that the cost of constructing a permanent facility rather than a temporary one
would not pay off until 2012. The House report also voices concern about the lack of
information on how the construction projects requested in the supplemental are integrated with
the Department’s long-term strategy for the basing of U.S. forces in the Central Command Area
of Responsibility (AOR). The report also questions the emergency nature and lack of
information for Congress review about plans to commit the United States to substantial military
construction in Kuwait. In the Senate report on H.R.1268, the appropriators’ voice considerable
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concern about whether all projects requested meet the emergency test of a supplemental. The
Senate Appropriations Committee also questions whether the construction of permanent facilities
(where proposed), rather than those of a more expeditionary (temporary) nature, is appropriate,
adding that in light of the expeditionary nature of our Nation’s efforts in Southwest Asia, the
Senate panel expects that temporary facilities would be the rule rather than the exception.
Emergency funding would not seem appropriate for projects requiring long-term planning
according to the panel (Belasco & Else, 2005).
The concerns raised by the Senate Appropriations Committee about permanent facility
and long term planning seem reasonable for most conventional expeditionary operation, but
counterinsurgency operations are known by military theorist to be long and protracted (Petraeus
& Mattis, 2006). It is apparent in the report that contingency operations are fluid, making long
term planning difficult. For this reason, long term economic analysis justification is difficult to
acquire, because long term planning in a contingency environment is extremely difficult as can
be seen in these discussions from 2005 as well as long term Operation Enduring Freedom
planning being discussed in the popular press today in 2010, 5 yrs later.
In addition to the procedural confusion for establishing economic justification, political
sensitivities further muddy the water with regard to permanent basing in the Southwest Asia.
CRS reports note that
Funding of military construction has been controversial for two reasons; concerns among
some members that construction indicates intent to set up permanent bases in Iraq and
construction funding in the United States that is part of proposed plans to increase the size of the
force, and not clearly an emergency. Although DoD has not ruled out retaining bases in Iraq,
current guidelines limit the use of concrete structures and emphasize building relocatable units
and the FY 2007 Supplemental continues a prohibition on spending funds to set up permanent
bases in Iraq (Belasco, 2008).
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Much of the literature explored has revealed that there is a gap between acquiring the
authorization for CCA and the funding of CCA, as CCA is often funded through supplemental
bills as opposed to funds being readily available. This may be attributed to the requirement to
reprogram MILCON projects in the United States, as it would divert spending and economic
impacts from congressional districts (Hughes, 2005). Additionally, there is substantial
controversy over what projects qualify for CCA. Now that information has been presented on
how CCA is being used, it is reasonable to now look at the consequences of such use.

Question Three
“What are the unintended consequences of the CCA process?”
The third question involves the analysis of a complex system. When agents create or
change policy in a complex system, it is often impossible to predict every consequence that could
precipitate. Furthermore, as literature is explored it may be difficult to distinguish between
policies and mechanisms associated with the advent of CCA or policy that was created to
compensate for consequences that were discovered later and were unexpected. Additionally, this
question is the most salient portion of the motivation for this research effort. Documented and
anecdotal evidence previously discussed suggests that the DoD is not able to use CCA as it was
intended. Consequently, the DoD has used practices such as possible project splitting, nonoptimal project redesign, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) servicing instead of
construction, and relocatable buildings. If this is the case, one may be curious if this is more
costly than a functioning or re-designed CCA process, which allows for higher project cost
ceilings and expedited access to additional funding. This research effort does not seek a
quantitative comparison costs, but it does aim to shed light on practices that would likely
influence cost, in hopes to provide artifacts for follow on research in that area.
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United States Code and AFIs provide some insight into the consequences associated with
CCA. The important language that exists in these regulations pertains, not to the authority to
spend money, but the ability to distribute funds. This important nuance must be recognized in
order to fully understand the way CCA is used and the consequences that arise. Air Force
Instruction 32-1021 5.2.3 and 32-1021 5.2.4 provides references to Contingency Construction
(10 U.S.C.2804) and Construction Authority in the Event of Declaration of War or National
Emergency (10 U.S.C. 2808) in enabling an expedited authorization process in a contingency
environment. “The Secretary of Defense may authorize the services to undertake military
construction projects not otherwise authorized by law. The Air Force may undertake these
projects only within the amount of funds appropriated (Department of the Air Force, 2003). The
final control placed on CCA restricts funding to “the total amount of funds that have been
appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have
not been obligated” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007). This is an important aspect of the
contingency construction policy, as funds must already be appropriated for military construction.
Major Hughes elaborates on this analogous point when discussing 10 U.S.C. 2803: Emergency
Construction, by stating that the main disadvantage to Emergency Construction is that it
merely provides authorization to spend funds, and not an actual appropriation. Funds to finance
the authorization must be reprogrammed (with congressional approval) from unobligated
MILCON funds…and Congress would be reluctant to approve cancellation of a required project
to fund and emergency construction project unless there was a truly dire need. Given this
limitation and an aversion to robbing Peter’s congressional district in order to pay Paul for
contingency construction somewhere else, the military rarely evokes the Emergency
Construction Authority (Hughes, 2005).
Similar to Emergency Construction, CCA has historically been paid for out of the annual
supplemental bills, presumably to preserve funds previously dedicated to MILCON projects in
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the states. This is the crux of the CCA process problem, in that the lack of funding negates any
flexibility and expediency gained by the authorization.
Hughes notes that the FY 2003 Emergency Supplemental authorized the Secretary of
Defense to transfer $150 million of O&M funds to this statutory authority for combat and
contingency construction. Contrary to its own declared preference, however, Congress has not
fully funded 10 U.S.C. 2804 (Contingency Construction) in subsequent years. The FY 2005
Nation Defense Act only provides $10 million for contingency construction under 10 U.S.C.
2804 Contingency Construction (Hughes, 2005).
On 16 November 2001 President Bush issued Executive Order 13,235 which specifically
invoked 10 U.S.C. 2808 (Construction Authority in the Event of Declaration of War or National
Emergency) in response to the terrorist attacks. The only other time a president has invoked this
authority was during the first Gulf War. As of 2005 the Department of the Army has not issued
any specific guidance or procedures for undertaking military construction under this authority.
While U.S. Codes such as 2808, and CCA provides greater responsiveness than the normal threetier system of the Military Construction Codification Act, these chronically ignored and
underfunded emergency statutory authorities ultimately do not solve commanders’ combat and
contingency construction problems (Hughes, 2005). This sentiment is echoed still today as DoD
leaders recently completing tours of duty in theater request fiscal reform, stating that “the current
legal constraints limit U.S. forces’ ability to use the funds which hinders effectiveness” (Petraeus,
2008).

Alternative Funding
Project Splitting
In addition to the funding of U.S. Codes authorizations, AFIs offer further insight into
possible consequences under current fiscal regulations. Air Force Instructions reference the
practice of project splitting as a possible consequence of the current project programming
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structure. To understand the implication of project splitting it is useful to recognize what it is
and how it is done. Hughes offers a brief discussion of the practice of project splitting and its
implications and states illegal project splitting occurs when a single military construction project
is broken down into several smaller projects to reduce its cost below applicable statutory
thresholds. Judge Advocates and programmers should determine whether the individual
components of a project are interdependent or merely interrelated components and may be
funded separately. Interdependent facilities are mutually dependant in supporting the functions
for which they were constructed and therefore must be costed as a single project. In contrast,
interrelated facilities have a common support purpose but are not mutually dependent and are
therefore funded as separate projects. Interrelated facilities are each complete and usable in their
own right, and may be properly funded as separate military construction projects (Hughes, 2005).
For example, if a
commander requires the establishment of a base camp in a foreign country. The base camp will
be used for an indeterminate duration, but certain facilities such as a perimeter fence and a
command and control bunker are required immediately. Other facilities, such as helipad and a
motor pool would be welcome, but are not strictly necessary. Second, the JA should determine
whether the individual components (in this case, the fence, the bunker, the helipad, and the motor
pool) are interdependent or merely interrelated components may be funded separately.
Interdependent facilities are mutually dependant in supporting the functions for which
they were constructed and therefore must be costed as a single project, for example, a new
airfield on which the runways, taxiways, ramp space, and lighting are mutually dependant to
accomplish the intent of the construction project. In other words, a project that is interdependent
with another project if it is not a complete and useable facility if built by itself. All of the
construction costs related to making the facility complete and usable must be lumped together to
determine the total cost. In contrast, interrelated facilities have a common support purpose but
are not mutually dependent and are therefore funded as separate projects, for example billets are
constructed to house soldiers with the subsequent construction of recreation facilities. Their
common purpose to support health, welfare, and morale creates an interrelationship. However,
neither facility is necessary for the operation of the other. Interrelated facilities are each
complete and usable in their own right, and may be properly funded as separate military
construction projects (Hughes, 2005).
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In an effort to mitigate project splitting, AFI 32-1021, Planning and programming
Military Construction (MILCON) projects, guides project programmers to follow a four-step
process in requesting construction authority. Air Force Instruction 32-1021.2.2 instructs project
programmers to first determine the requirements, then evaluate alternatives solutions, select the
construction project to meet the requirement and finally initiate programming action by
submitting appropriate documentation (Department of the Air Force, 2003). Often project
programmers are forced into a more practical sequence of determining the requirement, looking
for the funding avenue, and then determining the project that will fit the funding avenue.
As referenced in Chapter one, project splitting anecdotally seems to be a practice used
among project programmers in a contingency environment to get a project to fit a funding
avenue. Air Force Instruction 32-1021.3.2.2 and AFI 32-1021 4.2.2 attempts to mitigate this by
stipulating, “Each MILCON project shall result in a complete and usable facility or a complete
and usable improvement to a facility.” Furthermore, in the case of Unspecified Minor
Construction (UMC), “splitting requirements to keep project costs below the UMC threshold is
prohibited. An UMC project shall not be accomplished concurrently with a MILCON project in
the same facility. Combining UMC funds with other fund types to accomplish a single
requirement is prohibited” (Department of the Air Force, 2003).

Relocatable Buildings
One of the means by which commanders can acquire facilities to meet their mission
requirements in a timely manner is the use of relocatable buildings. A functioning CCA process
would facilitate the acquisition of a less mobile concrete masonry unit (CMU) building and
likely at a much reduced lifecycle cost. Because the CCA process is slow commanders look for
projects that can be funded with O&M money.
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Commanders should consider the use of relocatable buildings as a means of satisfying a
construction requirement, and not as an avenue of escape from the restriction on O&M funding.
Relocatable buildings may be used in one of two ways, either as a substitute for permanent
construction or as an interim facility requirement. Relocatable buildings can be used instead of
conventional permanent construction, particularly overseas, when the requirement duration is
unknown (Hughes, 2005).

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Service Contracts
Another programming alternative for meeting construction requirements is the use of
LOGCAP service contracts. Under an umbrella contract run by the U.S. Army Materiel
Command, LOGCAP contractors will provide commanders with comprehensive logistics,
engineering, and construction support during a contingency operation anywhere in the world on a
cost-plus-award-fee basis. Since December 2002, the military has contracted for more than $12
billion in LOGCAP services in more than half a dozen countries, including $5.6 Billion in Iraq
through May 2004. When LOGCAP is used in support of a mission, the operational commander
becomes responsible for defining services to be provided by the contractor, integrating contractor
personnel into the mission, and ensuring that funding is provided (Hughes, 2005).
“Under the Reres Doctrine, construction performed by a LOGCAP contractor could be
paid for with O&M funds where the construction was clearly intended to meet a temporary
operational requirement to facilitate combat or contingency operation” (Hughes, 2005). The
Reres doctrine is named after General Matt Reres the Deputy General Counsel on Ethics &
Fiscal law, who signed the policy letter (titled Construction of Contingency Facility
Requirements (22 Feb. 2000)) enabling the use of O&M funds for construction during
contingency operation (The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2007). “Since
LOGCAP was only available during wartime or contingency operation, and since the services
required were always related to the Army’s operational mission, no fiscal issue arose. The
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LOGCAP contractor is tasked with a service, such as troop bed-down or mess support, and then
builds the facilities required to perform that service. The LOGCAP contractor charges the cost
of the facility as part of the contractor’s overhead, and the title to the building passes to the Army.
Funneling construction through LOGCAP, therefore, allowed the Army to accomplish indirectly
what fiscal laws prohibited it from doing directly. Until the demise of the Reres Doctrine, units
in Iraq took full advantage of the LOGCAP loophole” (Hughes, 2005).
When LOGCAP was approved in October of 2003, the full consequence of the
congressional rejection of the Reres Doctrine had yet to be realized. Soon after, however
Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) had become uneasy about the gray
area created by LOGCAP construction and O&M funding. By December 2004, CFLCC’s
successor, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) had decided that there was no LOGCAP
exception to buying construction services, especially when there were no services contemplated
other that the construction itself. Any other interpretation would allow LOGCAP to swallow
MILCON funding rules entirely (Hughes, 2005).
After taking a brief look at a small portion of the complicated web of programming rules
and loopholes that exist, it is clear that programming acrobatics are required to procure facilities
to support contingency operations. Furthermore, often times DoD “personnel may not be well
equipped or prepared to avail themselves of the complex waivers and reviews provided for in the
acquisition system (Petraeus, 2008). Therefore, it is likely that cost, oversight, sound planning
and design may be compromised. During the data collection process for this research, which I
will develop in the next chapter, further clarity is likely to be gained. The methods outlined in
chapter three guided the data collection. The following section will highlight the literature used
to build this methodology.
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Methodology
CCA is evaluated by drawing upon the concept of Structuration Theory, first inspired by
Giddens (1979) and Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST), first proposed by Poole & DeSanctis
(1990). Giddens defined Structuration as “the structuring of social relations across time and
space, in virtue of the duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984). The project programming process
exhibits the concept duality of structure, in that the “essential recursiveness of social life, as
constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of
practice” (Giddens, 1979, p.5). This duality of structure may help explain the advent of
LOGCAP and the constraints placed on it, such as the prohibition of construction only service
contracts added upon the creation of MNF-I (Hughes, 2005).
There are many concepts within structuration and AST that are helpful in evaluating
CCA. It is useful to understand the distinction between allocative resources and authoritative
resources. Allocative resources are authority over objects, goods and materials phenomena;
while authoritative resources are authority over persons and agents (Dragos, 2006, p. 45). My
hypothesis is that one of the problems that plague the CCA process is that allocative resources
and authoritative resources are not aligned. Success in a contingency environment or any
collective human action is highly dependant on things such as buildings, machines, vehicles,
clothes, rooms, and electricity, water and sewage infrastructures (Orlikowski, 2006). The
organizational knowledge literature is also useful in understanding fiscal law and programming
procedures. Although organizational knowledge literature is often broadly characterized in to
the category of techno-centric and human-centric schools of thought, Orlikowski uses a
scaffolding metaphor to illustrate its complexity (2006). This metaphor is analogous to
institutional rules as they are also temporary, flexible, portable, diverse, heterogeneous,
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emergent, dangerous, generative and constitutive (Orlikowski, 2006). Specifically, institutional
rules are constitutive in that human activity and their outcomes shape the kind of construction of
work that is possible and outcomes become emerge. This emergence of outcomes can manifest
in the form of project splitting. These construction outcomes are dangerous in that they are
temporary, emergent, and rapidly constructed assemblages, that are vulnerable to breakdown and
failure (Orlikowski, 2006). This concept of emergent outcomes addresses cost, health, safety
and mission salience; all artifacts of project splitting. An example of an emergent health
outcome are the health effects of burn pits still being used as a result of the 2004 incinerator
projects being stopped due to an ADA violation. Furthermore, Orlikowski uses the concept of
temporal structure, which can be useful in understanding, why agents may resort to project
splitting. Agents use temporal structuring in order to produce specified parameters of acceptable
conduct (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). Clock time and event time (chronos and kairos) can be a
catalyst for temporal structuring (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). The role of a programmer or
commander may create and shape the temporal conditions, because of economic or institutional
pressure coupled with structural conditions outside their immediate control (Orlikowski & Yates,
2002). The agent creates workarounds and adaptations to speed up or manage time more
effectively without fundamentally changing the old structure, even while still believing they are
enacting the old structure (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). The literature surrounding the concept of
structuration theory and AST provides a lens by which one can better understand the
organizational behavior of agents in a contingency environment.

Constitutional Guidance
After reviewing the literature, it is apparent that there may be a conflict between
authoritative and allocative resources. To some extent, that is a result of the checks and balances
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of our nation’s Constitution that guide our nation’s leaders. The Constitution of the United
States was signed on September 17th of 1787 at the Pennsylvania State House. The preamble to
the constitution states that its intent is to “provide for the common defense” (Jordan, 2001). In
order to provide this “common defense,” specific guidance must be established in order to
orchestrate our nation’s leaders and their efforts. The Constitution of the United States provides
that orchestration by establishing a system of checks and balances between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government. The constitution has granted the executive
branch the authoritative power to wage war as the President of the United States is the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. For the President to wage war, resources must be
generated for such an effort. Allocative Power has been granted to Congress to “lay and collect
taxes, duties, imports and excises, to pay the debt and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States” (Jordan, 2001). Authoritative resources are limited as
allocative resources must be garnered, as “no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in
consequence of appropriation made by law” (Jordan, 2001). The appropriation bill releases such
money, but not without coordination as “every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of
the United States” (Jordan, 2001).
This constitutional guidance is alive and well today as funds for contingency construction
are released from the treasury under the authority of appropriation bills. Emergency construction
enables such projects through Title 10 U.S.C 2803; by declaring that emergency construction
may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military
construction (MILCON), including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been
obligated” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007). Therefore, funds that DoD has earmarked for
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MILCON are used to fund emergency construction or additional funds are made available
through supplemental bills to preserve previously allocated MILCON dollars. Furthermore, it
can be speculated that congress and local political leadership would be reluctant to cancel
MILCON projects in their district as it would divert significant economic stimulus from their
district.

Conclusion
In the literature review, insight has been gained with regard to the intent behind CCA,
how it is being used and what some of the consequences are, related to programming
construction projects in a contingency environment. Furthermore, the theories of structuration
and adaptive structuration have provided a lens into the organizational behavior at work in
programming contingency construction projects. The following section will present the
methodology used for this study. The methodology will draw upon the qualitative research
design literature, Structuration theory and AST. This synthesis of literature will guide the
development of the interview protocol and analysis.
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III. Methods
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the method used to determine the intent, current use and
consequences of the CCA process. The method for this study consists of five major areas:
research process, data collection, data source identification, sample population and data analysis.
These five areas will be clarified in the following sections by describing the terminology,
methods and justification for this study.

Research Process
The qualitative case study method is used to meet the purpose of this thesis. This method
has been employed in four different phases with different procedures applied for each phase.
Phase I, entailed a literature review of the current DoD regulations and documentation governing
the guidelines of construction in a contingency environment in order to outline the intent of the
current fiscal regulations. The literature review also included exploration of Structuration
Theory, AST and related concepts as a theoretical framework. Phase II consisted of a series of
antecedent semi-structured interviews in order to test the interview protocol. The results of the
antecedent interviews are analyzed in order to revise the interview protocol, if needed.
Additionally, each interview began by informing the interviewee that the research is unclassified
in order to avoid classified information that may compromise the publication of the research
results. Phase III, is a second more comprehensive set of semi-structured interviews in order to
explore the manner in which contingency construction is taking place and the way in which CCA
is being used. Finally, phase IV, provides a qualitative review of the results from phase III, by
means of open coding, in order to draw inferences about the impact of CCA on contingency
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construction projects. This clarifies issues such as project capacity to support the mission, affect
of project splitting (and other workarounds) on costs and safety associated with meeting mission
requirements and any other issue that may be revealed. The population of interest for this
exploratory case study research is personnel that are involved in contingency construction, such
as commanders, programmers, design engineers, customers, comptrollers, contracting officers,
lawyers and any other salient personnel that were thought to be able to provide insight. There is
a challenge due to a time-lapse between many of the respondents interviews and their
contingently experience. This is a validity challenge that receives deliberate attention during the
interview and data analysis phase. One method to counteract this is giving participants an
opportunity to deliberate about the interview and reengage later, after ample reflection.
Specifically, participants had two month to provide additional input before the research was
complete.
The data collection phase is an area that has been given attention and caution. Access to
the population of interest is a key concern. The population of interest is dispersed throughout
the globe. Furthermore, commanders and other personnel have limited time to participate in
interviews. For this reason, I was flexible in catering to the schedules of the participants. I
conducted all interviews in person or over the phone. Respondents were provided complete
anonymity in order to solicit candid responses. This is a concern as respondents may have
been involved in project splitting which is in violation of fiscal law under the Anti-deficiency
Act. Furthermore, data was censored in order to conceal respondents’ identity as it may result
in harm as defined by the internal Review Board. Furthermore, it is important to note that
during the interview and analysis phase I consciously attempted to refrain from letting my
personal biases affect the study. Naturally, researchers tend to look for data to confirm their
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assumptions and biases. I looked equally for data to confirm and refute my biases in order to
generate a broad range of rich data, in hopes to unearth new issues not currently realized.

Data Collection
Data collection for this study was conducted by means of semi-structured interviews.
The three questions guiding the study have been dismantled into an interview protocol. The
solidification of protocol questions are guided by Structuration and Adaptive Structuration
Theory and qualitative literature. The orchestration of the Structuration Theory, qualitative
literature and the development of the interview protocol are detailed below.

8 Protocol Questions
Question #1: How do you think the peacetime construction regulatory structure is performing in
the contingency environments?
Question #2: Do you think the CCA and MILCON regulatory structure is meeting its intent?
Question #3: Does the time required to execute a CCA project discourage its use?
Question #4: Have you observed any negative or positive consequences with seeking alternative
funding avenues? (time/cost/performance)
Question #5: What is your opinion of the MILCON threshold limit?
Question #6: What are the alternatives to seeking CCA and/or MILCON approval, in order to get
a project completed?
Question #7: How long does CCA take to get approved?
Question #8: Do you have any solutions you would recommend regarding contingency
construction?
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Qualitative Approach
A qualitative approach has been selected for its strength in answering the type of
questions that drive this study. This study seeks to answer questions relating to why a particular
phenomenon is occurring. In doing so, it is important to understand the context in which the
phenomenon is occurring. This study also seeks to identify unexpected phenomena and the
process in which the phenomena occur, as well as, causal explanation of the phenomena.
Qualitative research lends itself particularly well to these types of questions, as they are
commonly identified strengths of this the qualitative methodology (Maxwell, 2005).
Quantitative methods were not selected for this particular effort as this research does not seek to
count particular items as the relevant items are not currently know. Furthermore, this research
effort does not seek to make an inference about a particular population, rather it seeks to
understand the context of a particular process with in a specialized population.
In pursuing the qualitative method, Maxwell provides Figure 2 to illustrate the balance
and iteration required to coordinate the competing interests of qualitative research. The
following figure includes the key components of qualitative research design and illustrates the
interconnectedness and flexibility of their relationship. It is the purpose of qualitative research
design to create a coherent and workable relationship among these components (Maxwell, 2005).
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Figure 2: A Model of Qualitative Research Design

Semistructured Interview
This exploratory study, not only seeks to answer the three research questions posed, but
also uncovers other relevant ideas that help clarify the CCA issue. For this reason, the
semistructured interview approach was selected to “explore the topic more openly and to allow
interviewees to express their opinions and ideas in their own words” (Esterberg, 2002). This
approach is also “particularly useful for exploring a topic in detail” which is the aim of this effort
(Esterberg, 2002).
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Structuration Theory
Structuration Theory and Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) provide a lens into the
organizational behavior that precipitates from the construction programming regulatory structure.
Structuration Theory deals with social structuring and the interaction with agents acting within
that structure. Some simple analogies include forming a line at a store or quieting a boisterous
child in a quiet waiting room. Adaptive Structuration Theory looks at how those structures adapt
and transform based on interaction with agents operating within the structure. This could be
illustrated by observing how law enforcement operates in Compton vs. Beverly Hills California.
The agents may have attended the same police academy, but procedures and actions have
adapted based on the environment in which they operate. Likewise, the environment adapts to
these procedures and both are ever evolving. Structuration Theory and AST define key
theoretical terminology and reveal the applicability of concepts such as duality, recursiveness,
allocative & authoritative resources and emergent outcomes of temporary structures as they
apply to military organizational behavior in a contingency environment. The insight gained
through Structuration and AST contribute to the method used to collect qualitative data for this
study.

Data Source
I solicited interviewees based on their experience with contingency construction. This
study seeks to construct a holistic view of contingency construction. For this reason, a wide
range of data was collected from the prospective of civil engineers, commanders, lawyers,
programmers, staff officers and customers. In addition to a variety of career and organizational
prospectives, participants were selected based on their involvement in the process at various
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levels as illustrated in figure 3 below. This form of triangulation is one of many means by which
I intended to bolster validity. In the participant solicitation process, it was my goal to interview
agents at every level of the process. If this was not possible, interviewing an agent one level or
process away from a participant can offer valid conformation that the process exists and limited
insight into it. For example, if a participant at the brigade level sends a project request to a
missing participant at the Corps level and a participant at the Force level confirms receipt from
the Corps, then it is reasonable to assume that the Corps function exists and the interaction can
be described.

Participant

Missing Participant

Participant

Figure 3: Process Inference Example
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Sample Population
The population sampled for this research consists of nine participants with a broad range
of experiences covering both Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations, coupled with insight
from the Air Staff in DC. The sample includes Air Force, Army and Civil Service personnel
within the DoD from numerous levels of command. With an average age of nearly 21 years of
service, the participant’s ideas, presented in this study, represents a depth of understanding
within the DoD. As this is an exploratory study, the participants, as you can see below, were not
drawn from any particularly narrow demographic. The below table summarizes the population
represented in this study.
# = Number of Participants

Ave. Yr.
# Rank Service # Occupation # Level of Command
4 O-6

21.0 1 Support Officer

# Service

# AOR

2 Pentagon

5 USAF

2 Afghanistan/Iraq

1 O-5

1 Army Officer

3 Corps

3 Army

2 Iraq

3 O-4

1 Attorney

1 Embassy/Corps

1 Civil Service

3 Afghanistan

1 GS-13

2 Engineer

2 Group

1 Data Masked

1 Joint Contracting Command

2 DC

2 Civil Engineer
1 JAG

Figure 4: Sample Population

Solicitation took place through email and willing participants were contacted by phone to
confirm relevance of experience and establish rapport. Finally, telephone and in-person
interviews were conducted and recorded. The recordings were transcribed to provide an audit
trail and serve as an object of analysis by means of open coding. The transcriptions were
scrubbed of identifying characteristics in order to assure anonymity of respondents.
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Data Analysis
The data analysis strategy that was selected for this study is qualitative analysis. A pilot
interview was conducted and analyzed to test the interview protocol for usefulness and validity.
After the pilot interview was conducted, a series of interviews took place concurrently to further
refine the data collection process (Maxwell, 2005). Validity is addressed through long-term
interaction with participants, rich data collection, highlight discrepant evidence, triangulation and
comparison of result to establish a sense of variance. (Maxwell, 2005) Validity was further
strengthened by means of peer validation, as one of the research advisors was present during one
interview with two participants to ensure appropriateness of interview procedures. Furthermore,
the analysis tables can be found in the appendix for audit purposes and interview transcripts can
be requested for further view and validation.

Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the methodology used to collect, properly source and analyze
data to answer the questions that drive this study. Specifically, the data collection section
described Structuration theory, semistructured interview and the qualitative research approach
and offers the reasoning behind their use. Furthermore, the data collection section married the
literature review, Structuration Theory and the three research questions to develop the interview
protocol. Then the data source, sample population and data analysis sections outlined the
specific steps that would take place in order to solicit and analyze the data.
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IV. Analysis
Chapter Overview
This Section will present the method used to code and analyze the interview data. The
interview protocol was distilled into eight questions that most directly address the three
overarching research questions. This section will describe the means by which themes were
identified and provide a brief synopsis of the themes, suggestioning of the nature of the
interviews. This section will also address a previously stated hypothesis.

Method of Analysis
After I collected data, through recorded interviews, the audio files were sent to a
company, which provided transcription services. After receiving the interview transcripts from
the transcription service, I reviewed the audio files and the transcripts for accuracy and I
removed identifiers to assure anonymity of participants. Identifiers consisted of names, units,
dates, locations and so forth. The interviews generated 243 minutes of audio, resulting in 110
pages of transcripts. After the transcript files were prepared for analysis, I began coding.

Coding
In order to code the transcripts I reviewed both the audio and text files simultaneously
while looking for statements that pertained to the eight questions derived from the protocol,
listed later in this section. Statements were either extracted directly following the questions of
interest or pulled from conversation dealing with the question, which may not have been asked
directly, because the conversation naturally gravitated to that particular question or issue. Not all
the participants were presented with all the protocol questions, as they did not pertain to all the
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participants. For example, I would not ask a participant on staff in DC, if he or she was involved
in situations that required he/she to look for alternative programming avenues to get a project
funded, because he/she was not involved in that process in their job. Likewise, I would not ask a
commander about the advantages and disadvantages of funding CCA projects through the
Supplemental Bill as opposed to the Appropriation Bill.
The eight questions were entered into an excel table and the germane statements relating
to each question were entered in the following columns along with the participant ID number
that made the statement. Rather then entering the participants name directly, I used an ID
number to represent each participant. I then reviewed the statements and distilled them into there
essence, identifying the issue that was being addressed.

Theme Identification
In order to identify themes, the statements, remarks and the participant ID numbers were
entered into each row. Then the participant data was populated in the same row in order to
identify themes and trends. The participant data consisted of rank, years of service (Yr.),
occupation, service and AOR (Area of Responsibility) (Iraq and/or Afghanistan or DC). After
the excel table was populated with the questions, statements, remarks and participant data, I
highlighted the rows that had similar remarks or rows that had outlier remarks and looked
through the participant data to find trends. The example table below contains a list of themes
identified for each question. The full list of tables for each of the eight protocol questions can be
found in the appendix.
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Question 1
“How do you think the peacetime construction regulatory structure is performing in the contingency environments?”
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Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Well I think it’s the scale of the contingency environment. You’re
building cities from the ground up with no infrastructure. And we
rarely do that stateside. I mean, if we do it, the Congress knows
about it and they budget for it. And over there we are doing more
than that. I mean, we are – we are building the infrastructure the
buildings and everything else. And, you know, nobody
contemplates the true expense of all this. And I’m just – I was just
worried that we were circumventing the intent of Congress
constantly.

Not working
(Funding)

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

there’s two problems. One, there is a bureaucratic process that has Not working
4
dollar limits on it. And two, it truly only authorizes what is called (Funding, Process,
temporary construction.
definitional)
Not Working
the system is not designed for expeditionary operations. Military
8
(Process, Time,
construction is a very long and complicated process that requires
Congress approval.And a lot of the regulations that we have to abide complicated,
by are peace time regulations. So, is it accurate in saying that you congressional
believe they’re not performing in a contingency environment?That is approval)
correct. When we mobilize and we go overseas, and we work
overseas in a project in a contingency environment, all these
restrictions that are peace time restrictions do not help us at all.

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

28 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

I know we’re making extensive use of that. Like I say, about 300
Useful
projects a year, maybe worth 220, 230 million, something like that.
So, point being that we know the authority we have is a useful tool,
because it’s being used extensively. We’re putting up hundreds of –
well, you know, but hundreds of buildings over there – maybe over
the course of the 6 or 7 years, maybe – I don’t know, up to 2,000 of
these little buildings. And we need ‘em all, obviously. So, that’s a
tool that’s definitely being used. Obviously, everybody would like
to have a higher authority than 750K, but it is being used.

5

Table 1: Analysis of Question 1
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GS-13 20 Data Masked

Service AOR

Pentagon Civil
Service

DC

Theme

Process (O-6/
Engineer/ Corps/
Army/ Iraq)
Process (O-6/
Engineer/ Corps/
Army/ Iraq)

Outlier (DC/
Civil Service/
Pentagon)

Theme Synopsis
The theme synopsis draws upon the data identified in the analysis and comment on the
overall data for each question.

Question 1
“How do you think the peacetime construction regulatory structure is performing in the
contingency environments?”
Question #1 is primarily oriented toward addressing research question (RQ) #1 which is
to understand the intent of CCA. It was my understanding going into this research that CCA is a
means to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime regulations. I designed this question to
assess CCA’s ability to bridge that gap.
Four participants addressed this question with three stating that the peacetime
construction regulatory structure is not working or bridging the gap and one participant stating
that it is being used extensively and therefore a useful tool, deemphasizing challenges by saying,
“everybody would like to have a higher authority than $750K, but it is being used.” The other
three participants that did not believe CCA was performing well and referenced discontent with
amount of funding, the process (burdensome and untimely), the level of approval and
interpretation of “temporary construction.” This issue of temporary construction was raised
several times during this research and I will address it at this time.
The debate centered around the interpretation of temporary construction related to the
perceived intent. Some perceived that temporary construction is intended to limit the amount of
funds that DoD is spending on expeditionary operations by constructing temporary facilities as
our presence is expected to be for a short period. For this reason, some people believe the DoD
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should only build facilities with a short life expectancy. Generally, the belief is that the shorter
the life expectancy for the facility the less expensive it would cost to build. But this is not true in
all cases and therefore, is the crux of the debate. The example often referenced is the dilemma
between CMU (concrete masonry units) and CHU (Containerized Housing Units or trailers) to
house troops. I will allow the discussion to be rounded out by participant #4‘s statement below:
So the restrictiveness of the law does two things, one, in my opinion it goes against the
intent of Congress to do it in a cheaper, faster mode. It actually does it in a slower and more
expensive mode number one. Number two, CMU, and you know this, it’s obviously a far better
force protection measure than a CHU…. We were told to stop doing it because of this authority.
We were misreading it. We were calling these concrete missionary units temporary and they
said that’s not temporary. We were stretching the law I think at that time even though we did
have JAG concurrence…All those reasons count against temporary construction. And maybe
it’s a definitional problem? Yes. I think if this were presented to Congress, and every
Congressman that ever came through when we presented it to em and I presented it personally in
most cases, it was to them it was a no-brainer. They go ah, this is obvious. But whenever they
went back it was dead on arrival. It never, far as I’m concerned it fell on deaf ears… The “just
good enough” generated additional problems. Number one it frequently added to the cost or
obviously, the intent of temporary construction is to do exactly the opposite. It is actually
cheaper and faster to build CMU… CMU, and you know this, it’s obviously a far better force
protection measure than a CHU. That’s a problem with the law and that if anything needs to be
changed first because the latter has a direct effect on force protection and also has increased
casualties in Iraq unnecessarily by forcing us to go the temporary construction route in Iraq.
There have been a number of people who have been injured in trailers do to rockets and mortars
where if they had been in a concrete unit that would not have occurred. long-term maintenance
of those facilities and increased casualties that occur because of it.
Finally, to address the outlier comment, after reviewing the personal data it is apparent
that the disagreement is related to the level of command. The pentagon level participants
residing in Washington D.C. had a much more positive view while the three contradictory views
came from participants that had served in Iraq and Afghanistan, specifically at the Corps level.

Question 2
“Do you think the CCA and MILCON regulatory structure is meeting its intent?”
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Question #2 is also related to RQ #1, as it approaches the issue from a different angle,
trying to assess the participant’s perception of the intent of CCA and if it is meeting that intent.
Four participants address this question yielding seven separately identified statements.
All the participants responded similarly, stating it was not meeting its full intent. As this
question is similar to the previous question, participant #5’s response was somewhat different
referencing the usefulness as well as remarking about the lack of timeliness as the other three did.
Again, participant #5 is operating at the strategic level of command in Washington D.C.
Assessing CCA’s ability to meet its intent is one of the major issues of this study as it is
the catalyst for war fighters to seek other means to obtain projects in a more timely manner.
Participant #2 summarizes the sentiment well by saying:
the way CCA was always explained to me was it was a break the glass, got to have it now
type of program that, you know, I’m building something, I got – it’s more than $750,000.00 and
I gotta have it. And then whatever the process is up in DC to get it. And in theory – that’s the
theory, in practice I never saw it happen. My predecessor briefed me the exactly same thing that
I’m telling you now is that you cannot rely on a CCA turning quickly.

There was also an insightful comment regarding CCA’s intent that was made by the most
senior participant, a Colonel with 34 years of service:
CCA is really designed to grant authority for projects for where we have no intent for
long-term occupation of an area. Where in Afghanistan, that is in fact the plan and that’s
prohibited a lot of it in Afghanistan.
A similar statement was also made by participant #2 and #7, pointing out that without
CCA, contingency operations are difficult in Afghanistan, because of the lack of flexibility as
was clearly stated by participant #7:
When I was there, there was no CCA going on. And I don’t know if there was a
moratorium on it, but there was no CCA going on, at least at Bagram…So, really, if it wasn’t
done with relocatable buildings, then it would have taken three to five years, a long, long time.
Right. And that really wasn’t an option to wait that long.
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Question 3
“Does the time required to execute a CCA project discourage its use?”
Question #3 is directly related to RQ #2 and somewhat related to RQ #3, which is how
CCA is being used, and unintended consequences of the CCA process. Six participants made
statements regarding question #3 and all six stated that CCA took too long and forced them to
seek other means to get construction done in a timely manner. Participant #3 an attorney at the
corps level summarizes this sentiment, by stating:
we try to find a way, you know, we try to make it happen, but, you know, I kept saying,
“CCA.” “CCA.” “CCA.” That was my answer. And it was always, “No.” “No.” “No.” “We
can do it this other way.” “We can find a way.” “It’s too hard. It could take too long. Do it this
other way.” “O&M.” “We’ve got the money. There’s no reason we can’t do it. People are
gonna die.”

The above statement also addresses a theme that emerged during this research, which is
the fact that there are two schools of thought. One is to follow the rules and stay within
regulations and the other was to do what it takes to support the mission and get the job done as
illustrated below:
There was a big division between those who – who were trying to get things done, you
know, don’t stop the mission, and those who wanted to do it right under the law. I was told, you
know, “Marines are gonna die because you are stalling this process.”

Question 4
“Have you observed any negative or positive consequences with seeking alternative funding
avenues? (time/cost/performance)”
Question #4 directly addresses RQ #3, which is intended to identify consequences
associated with the way CCA is approved and funded. Seven participants made fourteen
statements in response to this question. Six stated negative consequences and one stated he/she
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did not know because of poor communication with the war fighters. This outlier was participant
#5 working in Washington D.C.
Participant #5 made a speculation with regard to communication that should be
highlighted:
You mean what effect it would have to the guy on the ground? I don’t know that we
sense that completely, and this is just my speculation, Captain, but maybe it’s because people in
the field know that the Pentagon is the Resource Provider, and so they don’t want to bite the
hand that feeds them. They’re not gonna complain too vociferously and say, “You clowns in the
Pentagon are taking forever to do this, “‘cause they may be concerned that, then, we’ll be not so
receptive to them in the future, I’m guessing. But that’s a human response. So, conversely, I
would say, if they don’t ever hear it and feel it, and understand the tangible impacts that time that
it takes to get the projects approved has (in terms of loss of life, property, equipment), then they
won’t ever have any sense of urgency to expedite it.

This point made by participant #5 addresses, in part, my motivation for this research,
which is to create a sense of urgency in fixing this issue. Identifying the tangible impact is the
intent of question #4, which I will now list the negative effect stated by the other six participants.
There was a variety of impacts sighted such as cost, ADA violations, health, safety, force
protection, and ability to support the mission. Participant #3 sighted an example relating to heath,
which was a theme among participants working at the Corps level:
In 2004 they were trying to put up incinerators all over because we had these burn pits
and it’s terrible for the health of the personnel working there. And it was a ADA violation, and it
got held up. And it was held up – I was there in ’07 and it was still held up. So the result is all
these people are breathing in this burn pit smoke we were trying, you know, to implement some
sort of environmental regulation to keep the troops safe.
This same issue was sighted by participant #4, the senior O-6:
As you recall in several of the bases had serious incinerator, burn pit issues, very serious,
especially some of the towers that smoke would pass by and it caused some serious problems.

Question 5
“What is your opinion of the MILCON threshold limit?”
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This question searches for a possible solution that I identified when I started this research,
as the minor construction limit was a common complaint from troops returning from theater.
Seven participants commented on this with the same response, that the $750,000 limit for minor
construction is too low. Many of the suggested solutions in question #8 requested that it be
raised. Department of Defense personnel involved in the CCA process shares this opinion as
participant #5 and #6 are currently striving to make changes to this:
Now there’s a great topic. [Chuckle] Oh, my. CENTCOM has written a legislative
proposal. It is at OSD Office of Legislative Counsel, that’s OSD/OLC, it is there right now. It’s
proposal number 65 for inclusion in the FY '11 NDAA, which will be developed this summer,
and hopefully passed in the fall – October or November, something like that. So, CENTCOM is
trying to increase it from 750K to 3 million for minor construction, using O&M funds. Yes, but
the CENTCOM proposal goes from 750K to 3 million – that’s – they’ve made it very clear it’s in
the proposal that it’s for contingency areas only.

Question 6
“What are the alternatives to seeking CCA and/or MILCON approval, in order to get a project
completed?”
Question #6 is related to RQ #3 and indirectly related to RQ #2. This question is
intended to identify the cause of the consequences with the intention of making a clearly
identifiable connection between the CCA process and consequences. It is indirectly related to
RQ #2 in that CCA is a process by which large scale contingency construction can legally be
carried out. This is identifying both legal and illegal means that may or may not be the most
appropriate. Several alternatives were identified such as project splitting, RLBs (relocatable
buildings), LOGCAP, troop labor and using personal property (which doesn’t count against the
$750,000 limit) such as HESCOs
The alternatives listed are tools used by troops in circumvent using CCA or MILCON
funding. This is primarily because these forms of construction can be paid for with O&M funds
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rather those slower CCA and MILCON funds. It is important to point out, CCA is paid for with
O&M funds, but because the approval and appropriation is different it effects the time required
to start construction. Participant #2, #3 and #4 (respectively) provides some insight into the
rational of seeking alternatives:
So what we would do was when we had big projects coming up, we would have a
meeting with the lawyers, the lawyer, the G8 or the resources. We would have the 4 would be in
there, and let’s see the 3. So these were the voting members on the JFUB. And so we would
present, “Here’s the project that we want to get. And this is how we are going to divide it up.”
The perimeter is project one. The gates is two, so on and so on and so on. And we were able to
get it where each project was separate by itself and didn’t rely on the other ones essentially to
make it complete and useable.
HESCO barriers being used. they would classify HESCOs as personal property and
therefore you just throw them up any and everywhere and you make buildings out them.
In OF2 in – we did in fact use a KBR and a lot of LOGCAP contracts in order to – for
them to provide us a service. So in other words if we wanted food to be served to us and it
required a building of a $5 million DEFAC, we said hey, go for it. You’re simply providing us
with a service. Go spend the money. there were projects that were done that way in the water
system –In fact, the projects that were in a deficiency act violations were in fact exactly that.

Question 7
“How long does CCA take to get approved?”
Question #7 provides insight into RQ #2, describing how long the CCA process takes. It
is also the mechanism, which initiates many of the consequences referenced in RQ #3.
Four participants made statements estimating the average length of time CCA takes with
the longest being nine months and the shortest being five months. The two participants that
stated nine months were both Army O-6s in Iraq at the Corps level and the shorts estimate of five
months were from the Pentagon staff. It is also important to point out that on rare occasions
projects were fast tracked and took as few as 21 days. This reveals that the ability does exist to
accelerate the process, as stated by participant #4:
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So it was taking 6 to 9 months. I will tell you that we had one project approved in 21
days. Can’t remember which one it was but I know the reason we got it done is because when it
was brought up to us. I wish I could remember the project, but we – I quickly went to MNF-I
and they got it to General Petraeus who happened to be coming back to the United States. He
personally briefed that to the Secretary of Defense and to Congress and it was immediately
approved.

Question 8
“Do you have any solutions you would recommend regarding contingency construction?”
Question #8 is not really related to any particular RQ and was not part of my original
protocol as I thought it would be a bit too ambitious to try to solve this massively complex
problem with one exploratory thesis effort. Participants naturally wanted to provide solutions
based on the course of questioning, so I thought it would be appropriate to document these
suggestions as well as solicit input from other participant, so I added it to my protocol half way
through my data collection process.
Suggestions to fix the problem are listed below
1. Increase CCA funding appropriation
2. Increase the minor construction limit of $750,000
3. Better communicate with Congress
4. Decrease CCA approval & funding time
5. Get the right people involved in the process
6. Improve cooperation between agencies
7. Clarify the definition of temporary construction
8. Better follow up by congressman
9. Lower approval authority
a. Delegate approval authority and congressional notification to Combatant
Commander
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b. Give the Secretary of Defense the authority to approve and fund CCA projects
10. Reprogram MILCON fund
11. Use a area cost factor for minor construction limits
12. Create contingency regulations with more flexibility
One suggestion that I would recommend in addition to the above listed is to adjust the
minor construction limit to keep up with inflation with either the Consumer Price Index or
Producer Price Index. This would prevent the periodic battle to raise it incrementally as we
have seen it go from $300,000 to $500,000 and $750,000 over the past few decades.

Hypothesis
I hypothesized, based on AST that “a problem that plagues the CCA process is that
allocative resources and authoritative resources are not aligned.” Throughout my research, few
participants were able to offer insight on this issue. One participant was able to offer a refutation
to this hypothesis and the dialog is provided below.
Interviewer: Yes, sir, and I have another question to follow-up on that, and that is, since
there’s been this shift from funding CCA through the supplemental to appropriation.
How has that affected has that accelerated or shortened the time it takes to actually
approve and fund these projects, or what’s been the effect of that? Participant #5: I don’t
think so, and the reason is that for Air Force purposes, ACC has been – they’ve been very
accommodating. Rather than wait for the supplemental they passed in May here, they
would go ahead and cash flow CCA projects, as soon as those projects were approved,
knowing that later ACC would be reimbursed via the supplemental bill. So, ACC just
took funds out of hide and cash flowed the CCA projects, and then they reimbursed later.
They’ve been really supportive about that. There has never been an instance where ACC
said, “We will not fund those CCA projects.” Instead, they’ve always been very
supportive of it.

While this data does not support the view that CCA is inhibited by funding through the
supplemental, it does exhibit AST in that the budgeting process has adapted to meet contingency
construction needs. In that regard, resources appear to be in conflict.
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Summary
This chapter has provided an outline of the method I used to analyze the data collected
from interviews. This section explained the method used to identify statements in the transcript
and connect them with the eight questions derived from the protocol. The theme identification
and theme synopsis section showed how participant’s responses were used to identify trends.
This section also addressed a previously stated hypothesis.
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V. Conclusion
Chapter Overview
This chapter will present the culmination of this research effort. I will make a connection
between both the eight questions from the protocol and three main research questions. I will also
present emergent concepts that were identified as a result of this thesis effort. The chapter will
end with limitations, motivation and bias and potential future research opportunities.

Research Questions
Question 1
What is the intent of CCA?
Much of the insight about the intent of CCA currently exists in relevant literature such as
public law and DoD regulations. For this reason, a Grounded Theory like approach was used to
provide an abstraction to support the use of data that resides in the literature. Further clarity has
been gained through interviews, soliciting the perceived intent of CCA by the participants and an
indication if that intent is being met.
Title 10 U.S.C. 2804 grants “the Secretary of Defense the authority to carry out a military
construction project not otherwise authorized by law, if deferral of the project for inclusion in the
next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or
national interest.” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007) Or as the war fighter states “it was a
break the glass, got to have it now type of program that, you know, I’m building something, I
got – it’s more than $750,000.00 and I gotta have it. And then whatever the process is up in
DC … that’s the theory.” (participant #2) What is not clear is how long it should take? Clearly,
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one can surmise from the law itself, that is should take less time then MILCON which is three to
five years (Mathews, 2006). One can also reason that seven days is likely unobtainable and
based on the interview data, the war fighter is not content with six to nine month lead-time.
Because of this the war fighter is seeking other programming avenues.
One clear fact is that the law grants authority to the Secretary of Defense, lowering the
approval authority from Congress to the Secretary of Defense. Although it is unclear if
congressional, notification is truly a notification or an approval process, as congress is
thoroughly scrutinizing projects. Many participants recommend lowering this authority level
even further. Specifically, two Pentagon level participants stated, “the most dramatic proposal
that came out of that Winchester Conference was that we see if we can delegate approval
authority to the COCOM.” (Participant #5) ”So, in that case, then you delegate the authority to
the Combatant Commander. You provide him with the ability to provide congressional
notification himself, or herself, or their selves. And then they have fixed resources through the
service components in the way that they POM, and then he were able to reach out and cap those
resources as needed.” (Participant #6)
It is also clear that CCA is intended to support MILCON level projects. It is clear from
the interviews that MILCON level construction is taking place outside the processes of CCA,
through project splitting, LOGCAP and personal property to name a few. Therefore, in that
regard CCA is clearly not meeting its intent. Although, in a more technical evaluation one may
state that projects programmed through CCA are being approved at a lower level and they are
taking less time them MILCON. Under those criteria, it could be described as meeting its intent.

Question 2
How is CCA being executed?
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This is clearly an exploratory question that has gained resolution throughout the data
collection process. Rather then restating what has previously been mentioned, I provide the
below value stream map to give additional understanding. It is also important to note that this
map represents the understanding of the participants involved in the research.
Depicted below is the process used for approving, validating and funding projects. The
colors indicate the time required to process a project depending on the type of funds being used.
It is important to note that this value stream map starts at the AFCENT level and lower level
process exist before it arrives at this level. It should also be noted that more detailed and
complex process exist within each approval level as depicted in the second value stream map
outlining the through processes at the Pentagon level.
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Figure 5: CCA Value Stream Map
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The below Pentagon level process flow shows the more detailed approval process at the
Pentagon level to include the average time for processing at each level. The summation of
processing time at this level is 60 working days. This does not account for weekends and
holidays. Lower level processes in the AOR would reflect more accurately as those functions
generally operate seven days a week.
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Figure 6: Pentagon Level Process Flow
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The process maps are provided as they can be used as a foundation to evaluate and
streamline the approval process in future research. The literature review has also provided some
insight into CCA execution. It is apparent, upon completion of the literature review and
interviews that CCA is not functioning as it was intended. Furthermore, CCA is stifled by the
uncertainty associated with contingency-based economical analysis (Belasco & Else, 2005).
Further influencing the execution of CCA is the political sensitivities associated with the
construction of permanent infrastructure for basing in Iraq (Hughes, 2005).
Orlikowski uses the concept of temporal structure which can be useful in understanding
why agents may resort to seeking alterative funding avenues in order to execute contingency
construction. Agents use temporal structuring in order to produce specified parameters of
acceptable conduct (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). Clock time and event time (chronos and kairos)
can be a catalyst for temporal structuring (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). The role of a
programmer or commander may create and shape the temporal conditions, because of economic
or institutional pressure coupled with structural conditions outside their immediate control
(Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). The agent creates workarounds and adaptations to speed up or
manage time more effectively without fundamentally changing the old structure, “even while
still believing they are enacting the old structure” (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). This theory can
explain why agents in the process may manipulate the system in order to speedup the approval
process by seeking approval through minor construction O&M funding.
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Question 3
What are the unintended consequences of the CCA process?
This question was directly addressed in protocol question #4 and generated the following
negative consequences: cost, ADA violations, health, safety, force protection, and ability to
support the mission.
Although, insight has been gained through the literature summarized in chapter II, the
interview protocol added further clarity to the consequences of the CCA process. It is apparent,
upon completion of the literature review and interviews that CCA is not functioning as it was
intended. I suspect as a result of the alteration of CCA execution and funding, consequences
such as; project redesign, projects splitting, LOGCAP, and others have been leveraged in order
to support contingency operation. As we have just reviewed the consequences of the CCA
process, we will now look to structuration to further guide our understanding of the results.
Structuration is defined as “the structuring of social relations across time and space, in
virtue of the duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984). In evaluating the consequences of the CCA
process, it is useful to consider the concept of duality of structure, in that the “essential
recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and
outcome of the reproduction of practice” (Giddens, 1979, p.5). This duality of structure may
help explain the use of LOGCAP to construct MILCON level facilities with construction only
service contracts in order to circumvent CCA (Hughes, 2005). This contracting tool provided
practitioners a loophole or structure in contract law, reflecting the recursive duality of
programming regulatory structure. This recursive transformation exemplifies the fact that
“structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practice.” (Giddens, 1979, p.5)
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These construction outcomes (programming structure, for example) are dangerous in that
they are temporary, emergent, and rapidly constructed assemblages, that are vulnerable to
breakdown and failure (Orlikowski, 2006). This concept of dangerous outcome vulnerable to
breakdown addresses the emergent outcomes of cost, schedule, performance, safety and mission
salience of construction projects, which are artifacts of project splitting (for example) as
peacetime programming structures are temporarily transported and rapidly constructed to be used
in a contingency environment. The interview protocol specifically sought to confirm practices
such as LOGCAP construction, project splitting, project redesign, and use of relocatable
buildings in order to clarify consequences CCA execution. The interview protocol also sought to
unearth evidence that there is a problem with CCA execution as it is being avoided by means of
evolution in duality of programming structure and temporal structuring. One of the participant
suggestions was to create a separate set of contingency regulations, which is complementary of
theory, removing the transportation of programming structure allowing contingency regulation to
mature in a contingency environment. Additional suggestion can be found in the emergent
concepts section of this chapter, revealed during the interview process.

Hypothesis
I did not find support from my hypothesis that “the reason CCA was taking so long is that
is was funded through the supplemental.” I do not believe this is a contributing factor, based of
the data collected. Research indicates that one Major Command, ACC, flows funding for CCA,
taking in out of hide through re-budgeting. (Participant #5) When I was in Iraq, staff personnel,
including myself, were told and believed that CCA projects would have to wait until the
supplemental bill was passed before funds would flow to CCA projects. This is apparently not
the case. Therefore, even though authoritative and allocative resources are not aligned, in some
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instances, this can be overcome thought re-budgeting and therefore not delay a project to the
degree previously thought.

Emergent Concepts
During the course of this research, conversations with participants reveal concepts that
did not directly address the questions of this research, but provide meaningful insight into the
topic of contingency construction in general. When these emergent concepts surfaced, I felt it
was important to document them.
One of the issues cited was the political sensitivity with long-term presence, which I
believe affects two areas. One is the interpretation of temporary construction, which is being
operatinalized as a ban on CMU (cited by many participants). The second is an undesirable
perception of a long-term presence by the Iraqi, Afghani and American people.
Another issue was raised regarding leadership pressuring subordinates to find alternative
solutions such as project splitting, RLBs and so forth. Compounding the problem, participants
also felt that JAGs where not equipped or willing to help provide legal solutions to contingency
construction problems. Related to the last point, some of the lawyers felt unequipped to perform
their job as well stating that they were not familiar with fiscal law.
Participants also stated that there was a lack of personnel resources to follow up, track
and inspect projects. They believed it contributed to some of the ADA violations, because of the
lack of dedicated personnel to track projects. Also, because CCA takes so long, requirements
change by the time projects are approved and the original project may not meet the current
mission requirements, as contingency operations are an ever-changing environment.
I brought up the next issue during an interview, which relates to the use of troop labor.
The Army reduced their engineering capability in the past as the Air Force is currently doing.
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The comparison of capability between military and contractors is often the center of discussion.
Troop labor is not counted against the minor construction limit; this needs to be considered,
because of the flexibility it provides. On more than one-occasion, contractors have refused to
perform, because of the risks of combat operations. Another consideration is that military
personnel are not constrained by a preexisting contracts and can provide commanders additional
flexibility in combat operations as illustrated in the below conversation:
Interviewer: Sir, I think that’s an interesting point that you brought up, and that is using
troop labor as a means by which we can somewhat circumvent those funding thresholds because
the labor is not counted against the construction cost. And as I understand it, and you please fill
me in, ‘cause I’m sure I’m not as familiar with it as you are, but it’s my understanding that the
Army got rid of a lot of their construction capabilities I think in the '90s, possibly. And part of
that analysis involved saying that contractors can do everything that active duty military can do,
or Reserves. But in fact, that might not be the case in a contingency environment, because
contractors, all their labor costs go against the construction limit. But troop labor does not. So,
it seems like that may not have been an accurate assessment back when they did that analysis.
Participant #8: That is a true statement....because of that fact, the use of troops...should be the
first – because of all the other restrictions because of contingency and military construction
restrictions, ... to expedite those projects, and that may or may not affect the commander’s
flexibility in the plan.

When considering these consequences it is important to keep in mind the limitations,
motivation and bias of this research.

Limitations
This research was conducted with the understanding that this would be a qualitative
exploratory study. For that reason, the sample size is modest with nine participants. These
participants shared their experiences with contingency construction in Iraq, Afghanistan and
support from Washington D.C. Because this was a small sample, considering the problem space,
one may have difficulty gaining confidence about making inferences about the entire problem
space. This study drew upon the experience of nine participants therefore may not provide a
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precise representation of the entire problem space, but rather a rough sketch. This research
identified increased cost as a consequence, of the current CCA process. If the CCA process was
to incorporate all the suggested solutions, one cannot confidently predict the impact on cost or
other factors for that matter. Furthermore, I think it is fair to consider the motivation and bias of
this study when considering limitations.

Motivation and Bias
I was motivated to study this issue after my experiences in Iraq, as expressed in Chapter
one. I started with a preconceived notion that a problem exists and I wanted to identify and help
solve it. I constructed this study to uncover those issues. Therefore, this was not a constructivist
epistemological study, but rather action research. Based on documented memorandums between
General David Petraeus and the Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn I felt justified in
making that assumption that a problem existed.

Future Research
This research was intended to provide clarity into the CCA issue as well as action
research to motivate leadership to generate change in the CCA approval and funding process. I
hope this exploratory research has laid a foundation for further research to evaluate and correct
the CCA approval and funding process. I also hope that future research will be done in the area
of fiscal law, both in clarification of definitions and intent. It would also be appropriate to
quantitatively evaluate the impact of the CCA process, in order to bring clarity to a more
economical solution to contingency construction.
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Appendix
Analysis Tables for the Eight Protocol Questions
Question 1
“How do you think the peacetime construction regulatory structure is performing in the contingency environments?”
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Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Well I think it’s the scale of the contingency environment. You’re
building cities from the ground up with no infrastructure. And we
rarely do that stateside. I mean, if we do it, the Congress knows
about it and they budget for it. And over there we are doing more
than that. I mean, we are – we are building the infrastructure the
buildings and everything else. And, you know, nobody
contemplates the true expense of all this. And I’m just – I was just
worried that we were circumventing the intent of Congress
constantly.

Not working
(Funding)

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

there’s two problems. One, there is a bureaucratic process that has
dollar limits on it. And two, it truly only authorizes what is called
temporary construction.
the system is not designed for expeditionary operations. Military
construction is a very long and complicated process that requires
Congress approval.And a lot of the regulations that we have to abide
by are peace time regulations. So, is it accurate in saying that you
believe they’re not performing in a contingency environment?That is
correct. When we mobilize and we go overseas, and we work
overseas in a project in a contingency environment, all these
restrictions that are peace time restrictions do not help us at all.

Not working
4
(Funding, Process,
definitional)
Not Working
8
(Process, Time,
complicated,
congressional
approval)

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

28 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

I know we’re making extensive use of that. Like I say, about 300
Useful
projects a year, maybe worth 220, 230 million, something like that.
So, point being that we know the authority we have is a useful tool,
because it’s being used extensively. We’re putting up hundreds of –
well, you know, but hundreds of buildings over there – maybe over
the course of the 6 or 7 years, maybe – I don’t know, up to 2,000 of
these little buildings. And we need ‘em all, obviously. So, that’s a
tool that’s definitely being used. Obviously, everybody would like
to have a higher authority than 750K, but it is being used.

5

Table 2: Analysis of Question 1
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GS-13 20 Data Masked

Service

Pentagon Civil
Service

AOR

DC

Theme

Process (O-6/
Engineer/ Corps/
Army/ Iraq)
Process (O-6/
Engineer/ Corps/
Army/ Iraq)

Outlier (DC/
Civil Service/
Pentagon)

Question 2
“Do you think the CCA and MILCON regulatory structure is meeting its intent?”
Response

Remarks

68

the way CCA was always explained to me was it was a break the
No (Time)
glass, got to have it now type of program that, you know, the I’m
building something, I got – it’s more than $750,000.00 and I gotta
have it. And then whatever the process is up in DC to get
it___________. And in theory – that’s the theory, in practice I never
saw it happen. My predecessor briefed me the exactly same thing
that I’m telling you now is that you cannot rely on a CCA turning
quickly.
CCA in that it did not work for us.
No
CCA doesn’t work and is not timely enough for you.
No (Time)
Yes, and that was the complaint. “Oh, it takes too long to get that.” No (Time)
CCA was something that, if it was available then it seemed like the
Secretary of the Army or someone could approve it. But it was
never available.
– it’s hard to say an average but I would say a minimum 6 to 9
No (Time)
months where the goal as I understand the intent of the law, it’s only
supposed to take 30 to 45 days.
CCA is really designed to grant authority for projects for where we No (only for no
have no intent for long-term occupation of an area. Where in
intention for long
Afghanistan, that is in fact the plan and that’s prohibited a lot of it in term presence,
Afghanistan.
prohibited in
Afghanistan)
– in terms of quick, in terms of rapid approval – probably not. We No (Time), Yes
need to streamline. We know we have to. But the ultimate
Useful
objective of providing facilities, we’re very pleased that we’ve got
CCA as a tool.

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

2
2
3

O-5
O-5
O-4

19 Army Officer
19 Army Officer
12 Attorney

Corps
Army
Corps
Army
Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Afghanistan/
Iraq

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Insightful
Response, Long
Term Presence
Afghanistan (34)

5

GS-13 20 Data Masked

DC

Outlier (DC/
Civil Service/
Pentagon)

Table 3: Analysis of Question 2
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Pentagon Civil
Service

Theme

Question 3
“Does the time required to execute a CCA project discourage its use?”
Response

Remarks ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

Theme

69

the base just exploded population-wise. Let’s see four – about four times Yes
the enduring population of the – is what we were surging to. So the only
way to get there was to do the O&M funding – the quick and so forth, and
it wasn’t quick by any stretch of means. Okay. So the primary motivator
for going with the relocatable buildings was the timeframe to get that
down. Yes. our only option was to do relocatable buildings.

1

O-6

24 Support
Officer

Group

USAF

Afghanistan Yes (all)

My predecessor briefed me the exactly same thing that I’m telling you now Yes
is that you cannot rely on a CCA turning quickly.
Yes, and that was the complaint. “Oh, it takes too long to get that.” CCA Yes
was something that, if it was available then it seemed like the Secretary of
the Army or someone could approve it. But it was never available.
Right. And we try to find a way, you know, we try to make it happen, but, Yes
you know, I kept saying, “CCA.” “CCA.” “CCA.” That was my answer.
And it was always, “No.” “No.” “No.” “We can do it this other way.”
“We can find a way.” “It’s too hard. It could take too long. Do it this
other way.” “O&M.” “We’ve got the money. There’s not reason we can’t
do it. People are gonna die.”

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan Yes (all)

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan/ Yes (all)
Iraq

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan/ Yes (all)
Iraq

bureaucratic process at least at that time that was a bit burdensome.

Yes

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Yes (all)

So, if your premise is, going in, that the Department of Defense needs to
Yes
find a more expeditious way of meeting our war fighter’s needs and the
dynamic, ever-changing requirements on the ground, I would say you have
a very good premise going in, just based on ******** spiel here that he’s
given you in terms of what it takes to get one of these things approved.

6

O-4

11 Civil Engineer Pentagon USAF

DC

Yes (all)

CCA affects the process, but it is still not as fast as a operational
contingency requires.

8

O-6

28 Engineer

Iraq

Yes (all)

Yes

Table 4: Analysis of Question 3
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Corps

Army

Question 4
“Have you observed any negative or positive consequences with seeking alternative funding avenues? (time/ cost/ performance)”

70

Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

And since they were relocatable, nobody really saw problems until the
potential anti-deficiency issue cropped up

Negative (ADA)

1

O-6

24 Support
Officer

Group

USAF

Afghanistan

you know, basically built close to the limit, again, to give us more space. It
probably didn’t meet the requirement (quote/unquote),It didn’t meet the
needs whatsoever. I mean, as far as it couldn’t hold probably a tenth of the
people that need to process in and out of the PAX terminal and have good
control of the people for accountability of who was going where and
coming in.
the other one that affected operations was the construction of internment
facilities. Cause you know you need the internment facilities before you
start capturing people.
Core of Engineers never when back to check on the lawyers to see whether
the additions onto this project, which apparently were just very bare
minimum when it went through these things augmented in a way that was,
you know, a violation of the ADA. And eventually, you know, I said,
“Yeah, this is a ADA violation, I think.”
Brick and morter Yes, less expensive

Negative ("It
didn’t meet the
needs
whatsoever")

7

O-6

24 Civil Engineer Group

USAF

Afghanistan

Negative
(Mission)

8

O-6

28 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Negative (ADA)

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy USAF
/Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

Negative (Cost)

1

O-6

Group

USAF

Afghanistan Cost (O-5/6)

we have to use HESCO barriers for everything. So essentially what
happens is we use HESCOs to build a battalion size FOB which are very
expensive. Gravel was very – everything is expensive in Afghanistan.

Negative (Cost)

2

O-5

24 Support
Officer
19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan Cost (O-5/6)

you spent about, you know, about $10.000 worth of man-hours trying to
get it legal and sufficient.
The “just good enough” generated additional problems. Number one it
frequently added to the cost or obviously, the intent of temporary
construction is to do exactly the opposite. It is actually cheaper and faster
to build CMU.

Negative (Cost)

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan Cost (O-5/6)

Negative (Cost)

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Table 5: Analysis of Question 4
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Theme

Cost (O-5/6)

Question 4 (Continued)
“Have you observed any negative or positive consequences with seeking alternative funding avenues? (time/ cost/ performance)”
Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr. Occupation Level

Service AOR

Theme

Army

Cost (O-5/6)

71

Negative (ADA,Cost) 4
LOGCAP In fact, the projects that were in a deficiency act
violations were in fact exactly that. I don’t recall all of them but
I cannot throw the water project out. You probably saw it as you
pass, there were 3 or 4 water tanks that were – it was at a 95%
completion. There was a sewage plant that was located nearby
that was a stop project that was at about 50% completion. All
the equipment was on the ground. It was laying there basically.
They were initially allowed back in OF1 and 2 but they were
stopped at the beginning of what we’d call OF3. Those were –
any projects ongoing like that were stopped.

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

remember IG came over and they were looking of some of the
Negative (Safety)
pictures that we had of the HESCO towers, and they looked like
they were about to just completely collapse. And they said, “Get
rid of those things and build real towers.”
in 2004 they were trying to put up incinerators all over because Negative
we had these burns and it’s terrible for the health of the
(ADA,Health,Safe)
personnel working there. And it was a ADA violation, and it got
held up. And it was held up – I was there in ’07 and it was still
held up. So the result is all these people are breathing in this
burn pit smoke we were trying, you know, to implement some
sort of environmental regulation to keep the troops safe

3

O-4

12

Attorney

Embassy/C USAF
orps

Afghanistan/ Health and/or
Iraq
Safety (Corp)

3

O-4

12

Attorney

Embassy/C USAF
orps

Afghanistan/ Health and/or
Iraq
Safety (Corp)

Table 6: Analysis of Question 4 (continued)
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Iraq

Question 4 (Continued)
“Have you observed any negative or positive consequences with seeking alternative funding avenues? (time/cost/performance)”

72

Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

CMU, and you know this, it’s obviously a far better force protection
measure than a CHU. That’s a problem with the law and that if anything
needs to be changed first because the latter has a direct effect on force
protection and also has incressed casualties in Iraq unnecessarily by
forcing us to go the temporary construction route in Iraq.There’ve been a
number of people who have been injured in trailers do to rockets and
mortars where if they had been in a concrete unit that would not have
occurred. long-term maintenance of those facilities and increased
casualties that occur because of it.
As you recall in several of the bases had serious incinerator, burn pit
issues, very serious, especially some of the towers that smoke would pass
by and it caused some serious problems.
Maybe not, and I’m gonna guess it’s because – well, see – I guess by
implication you mean what effect it would have to the guy on the
ground?I don’t know that we sense that completely, and this is just my
speculation, Captain, but maybe it’s because people in the field know
that the Pentagon is the Resource Provider, and so they don’t want to bite
the hand that feeds them.They’re not gonna complain too vociferously
and say, “You clowns in the Pentagon are taking forever to do this,
“‘cause they may be concerned that, then, we’ll be not so receptive to
them in the future, I’m guessing.But that’s a human response. So,
conversely, I would say, if they don’t ever hear it and feel it, and
understand the tangible impacts that time that it takes to get the projects
approved has (in terms of loss of life, property, equipment), then they
won’t ever have any sense of urgency to expedite it.

Negative (Cost,
4
Safety/Force
Protection, lose of
life)

O-6

34 Engineer

Negative
(ADA,Health)

O-6

34 Engineer

4

Service AOR

Theme

Corps

Army

Iraq

Health and/or
Safety (Corp),
Force Protection
(34)

Corps

Army

Iraq

Health and/or
Safety (Corp)

Don't Know (Poor 5
Communication
with troops in
field)

GS-13 20 Data Masked

Pentagon Civil
Service

DC

Outlier Don't
Know & Poor
Communications
(Pentagon/ Civil
Service/ DC)

That would not be contested here, but it does raise a point. The DD1391 Don't Know (Poor 5
has to state that we are performing minimum level of construction. And Comm w/ troops
if that means CMU, okay. OSD Comptroller will not turn down a project in field; Can CMU
that cites use of CMU. However, it’s incumbent upon us to state in the be used?
1391 that use of CMU is the minimum level of construction that’s
Conflicting
accessible.
understanding)

GS-13 20 Data Masked

Pentagon Civil
Service

DC

Outlier Don't
Know & Poor
Communications
(Pentagon/ Civil
Service/ DC)

Table 7: Analysis of Question 4 (continued)
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Question 5
“What is your opinion of the MILCON threshold limit?”
Response

Remarks ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

Theme

73

, the Chief of Staff, the Air Force Civil Engineer – when folks would come into Too Low
Bagram, we were very consistent in our message that the funding limitations – the
MILCON funding limitations at 750 and 1.5 need to be doubled at least in today’s
environment. Afghanistan is at the end of the world’s longest supply chain. And
to have notions that we can build under those parameters for those kinds of costs
is just – it’s not reality in today. It needs to be something different for AOR.

1

O-6

24 Support
Officer

Group

USAF

Afghanistan Too Low (all)

all the projects if you took them and if you took them in whole, they’re all over
Too Low
the $750,000.00 limit, everything. I mean even if I built a facility for a 30 man
platoon, it would be over $750,000 because once you put in – again the HESCOs
are so expensive, all the labor, you know, electrical grid. It’s just insane.

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan Too Low (all)

, the MILCON limits are outdated.
quite frankly the MILCON levels has to go up in the contingency environment.
somebody’s got to realize that these things are costing more, and we need to raise
the limit from 750 or higher or else just notify Congress that this is just not gonna
work.
So the total authority dollars is too low
Now there’s a great topic. [Chuckle] Oh, my. CENTCOM has written a
legislative proposal. It is that OSD Office of Legislative Counsel, that’s
OSD/OLC, it is there right now. It’s proposal number 65 for inclusion in the FY
'11 NDAA, which will be developed this summer, and hopefully passed in the fall
– October or November, something like that.So, CENTCOM is trying to increase
it from 750K to 3 million for minor construction, using O&M funds.Yes, but the
CENTCOM proposal goes from 750K to 3 million – that’s – they’ve made it very
clear it’s in the proposal that it’s for contingency areas only.

Too Low
Too Low
Too Low

2
2
3

O-5
O-5
O-4

19 Army Officer
19 Army Officer
12 Attorney

Corps
Army
Corps
Army
Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan Too Low (all)
Afghanistan Too Low (all)
Afghanistan/ Too Low (all)
Iraq

Too Low
Too Low

4
5

O-6
34 Engineer
GS-13 20 Data Masked

Corps
Army
Pentagon Civil
Service

Iraq
DC

750,000, is that restricting our efforts in construction, or do you think that should Too Low
be adjusted at all?Yeah, I would say it is. But I’m not sure what the right answer
is. How much do you make, and do you make it – do you double it and make it
1.5 mil, or you just bump it up another $250,000.00 and make it 1 million just for
those normal things versus the – you know, the other ones that are life, safety,
etc.,
not only is the notification process is cumbersome, but the limits are too low.and Too Low
the limit is $750,000.00, that is a very restricting fact, that we have being the law
that makes it totally and completely unworkable.

7

O-6

24 Civil Engineer Group

USAF

Afghanistan Too Low (all)

8

O-6

28 Engineer

Army

Iraq

Table 8: Analysis of Question 5
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Corps

Too Low (all)
Too Low (all)

Too Low (all)

Question 6
“What are the alternatives to seeking CCA and/or MILCON approval, in order to get a project completed?”

74

Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

Because, you know, you could essentially chop the number of buildings down or
program is such that from the Air Force and Army perspective at the time that fit that
kind of funding.
And since they were relocatable, nobody really saw problems until the potential antideficiency issue cropped up
So what we wound up doing is adding bits and pieces, keeping it under the 750. RED
HORSE would do a piece on one part of the ramp, and then civil engineers would do
another. We’d do a smaller contract. And that’s how we were able to keep up with the
rapid expansion with the number of aircraft that came in as well.
So what we would do was when we had big projects coming up, we would have a
meeting with the lawyers, the lawyer, the G8 or the _____________ resources. We
would have the 4 would be in there, and let’s see the 3. So these were the voting
members on the JFUB. And so we would present, “Here’s the project that we want to
get. And this is how we are going to divide it up.” The perimeter is project one. The
gates, perimeter two, so on and so on and so on. And we were able to get it where it
project was separate and above itself and didn’t rely on the other ones essentially to
make it complete and useable.
Core of Engineers never whet back to check on the lawyers to see whether the additions
onto this project, which apparently were just very bare minimum when it went through
these things augmented in a way that was, you know, a violation of the ADA. And
eventually, you know, I said, “Yeah, this is a ADA violation, I think.”
15 projects, each worth less than $750,000.00 and each were individual, you know – I
can’t remember what the term was – project?each one of them was in and of themselves
complete and useable, but you would never in a million years have a complete and
useable dorm out in the middle of Afghanistan without the other projects surrounding
it.spirit of the law was not met.

Project Splitting

1

O-6

24 Support
Officer

Group

USAF

Afghanistan

RLBs

1

O-6

Group

USAF

Afghanistan

Project Splitting

1

O-6

24 Support
Officer
24 Support
Officer

Group

USAF

Afghanistan

Project Splitting

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

Project Splitting

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy USAF
/Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

Project Splitting

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy USAF
/Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

Table 9: Analysis of Question 6
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Question 6 (Continued)
“What are the alternatives to seeking CCA and/or MILCON approval, in order to get a project completed?”
Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service

AOR

75

I got wind of these wells and how they were getting built. It seemed that they had the Project Splitting
Air Force folks, maybe, were coming in to do one leg of it, and then they would have,
maybe, the Seabees do another leg, and they would contract out a part of it. dug by the
Air Force for a certain cost and then capped. And they would dig all these wells all
over Afghanistan and cap them. And then when they were ready to, you know – what’s
the word? You know, finish them off or keep them going, they would get some other
company in there to do that or the seabees or somebody. And they would come in and
they would build the hut that goes near it.

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

Project Splitting
– the jail that they just built there, they were – it was amazing they were fitting under
the rubric of all these terms. you know, it’s not complete – it’s not necessary for the
complete and usableness of this facility to have the vocational wing, you know.
RLBs
So you could put a lot of trailers in with minimal MILCON dollars involved. Or if
you’re not gonna exceed the MILCON threshold, I’m sorry. Where if you build CMUs,
you will quickly reach those points.
Project Splitting
. However, I do know personally because I had been there over a period of time, that
there were projects where these were done later to the project where there had been no
expansion incapability’s but they added to the project cost that would have broken the
MILCON threshold. I do know that occurs. So it was clearly a MILCON bust.

3

O-4

12 Attorney

Embassy/ USAF
Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

RLBs, they were using – and from off the top of my head – I think it was somewhere
RLBs
between 10 and $12 million project to build like 19 facilities. And the goal was to try
to get this quicker Yes, sir. So, would you say your – it sounds to me like your reason
for choosing relocatable buildings was that the brick and mortar buildings were for the
steady-state long term, and the relocatable were so that they could be possibly
redistributed throughout theater when the base did draw down?(Quote/unquote) yeah. I
mean, that’s – do I really believe that they’d be relocated? Probably not. I mean, ‘cause
– they did put a tin metal roof over – when the Army actually had a couple sets of RLBs
themselves like that, except theirs were two stories, and it did have a metal roof on it,
etc., too.were RLBs was to avoid the MILCON threshold? Did that play a role at
all?Yeah, I would definitely say that would play a role

7

O-6

24 Civil Engineer Group

USAF

Afghanistan

Table 10: Analysis of Question 6 (Continued)
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Question 6 (Continued)
“What are the alternatives to seeking CCA and/or MILCON approval, in order to get a project completed?”
Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr. Occupat Level
i
8 O-6
28 Engineer
Corps

the use of relocatable buildings was one way.
RLBs
different construction agencies also affected. For example, if you use
Troop Labor
8
troops, The labor is not counted towards the construction cost.
The big issues with that, I believe you also mentioned earlier, was
Project Splitting 9
project splitting. Because it’s – that is, I would say – because you don’t
have to notify Congress and wait the required days – whether it’s 10
days or – electronic notification I think is 10 or 15. Then, that is the
more expedient way to do it, ‘cause if you have a project that could be
funded with $750,000.00, that’s much faster than going through the
congressional notification.But you gotta make sure that it’s a complete
project – you got a complete and usable facility after it’s done.

Service AOR
Army
Army

Theme

Iraq
Iraq

O-6

28

Engineer

Corps

O-4

14

JAG

Joint
USAF
Contracting
Command

Afghanistan/
Iraq

76

Okay. How about relocatable buildings? Was that one means by which RLBs
you can stay under the $750,000.00 threshold?Yep, that’s the one as
well, because you had relocatable buildings.

9

O-4

14

JAG

Joint
USAF
Contracting
Command

Afghanistan/
Iraq

we have to use HESCO barriers for everything. So essentially what
HESCOs
happens is we use HESCOs to build a battalion size FOB
HESCO barriers being used. they would classify HESCOs as personal HESCOs
property and therefore you just throw them up any and everywhere and
you make buildings out them.
In OF2 in – we did in fact use a KBR and a lot of LOGCAP contracts in LOGCAP
order to – for them to provide us a service. So in other words if we
wanted food to be served to us and it required a building of a $5 million
DEFAC, we said hey, go for it. You’re simply providing us with a
service. Go spend the money. there were projects that were done that
way in the water system –In fact, the projects that were in a deficiency
act violations were in fact exactly that.

2

O-5

19

Corps

Army

3

O-4

12

Army
Officer
Attorney

Embassy/
Corps

USAF

Afghanistan HESCOs
(Corps)
Afghanistan/ HESCOs
Iraq
(Corps)

4

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Table 11: Analysis of Question 6 (Continued)
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Iraq

LOGCAP
(34)

Question 7
“How long does CCA take to get approved?”
Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

CCA, The problem is the authority for that is Congress. So what
you get essentially is a – you’re getting basically the same type of
authorities for different money, but the timeline is essentially the
same.
it probably took about six months, I think – maybe a little bit less –
from the time we identified these projects to getting the authorities
to start building them.
Multiple levels of bureaucracy, each one of them went through fairly
quickly but at the end of all that, there was a problem and weekends
mattered, the time difference had an impact, everything caused an
extra delay, a day or so. It was not unusual to get several months’
delay
Oh, maybe I’d say like five, six months.

Essentially same
as MILCON

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

6 Months

2

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

Several Months
Delay

4

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

5 to 6 Months

5

GS-13 20 Data Masked

it’s hard to say an average but I would say a minimum 6 to 9 months 6 to 9 months

4

O-6

6 to 9 months/ one 4
project approved
in 21 days

9 Months

DC

34 Engineer

Pentagon Civil
Service
Corps
Army

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

28 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Iraq

77
And so it was taking 6 to 9 months. I will tell you that we had one
project approved in 21 days. Can’t remember which one it was but I
know the reason we got it done is because when it was brought up to
us. I wish I could remember the project, but we – I quickly went to
MNFI and they got it to General Petraeus who happened to be
coming back to the United States. He personally briefed that to the
Secretary of Defense and to Congress and it was immediately
approved.
– we had CCA authority, which was authority that would take five
years would take 9 months. Okay?

8

Table 12: Analysis of Question 7

77

Theme

9 Months (O-6/
Corps/ Army/
Iraq)
9 Months (O-6/
Corps/ Army/
Iraq)

9 Months (O-6/
Corps/ Army/
Iraq)

Question 8
“Do you have any solutions you would recommend regarding contingency construction?”

78

Response

Remarks

, the Chief of Staff, the Air Force Civil Engineer – when folks would come into
Bagram, we were very consistent in our message that....the MILCON funding
limitations a... need to be doubled at least in today’s environment. Afghanistan is at
the end of the world’s longest supply chain. And to have notions that we can build
under those parameters for those kinds of costs is just – it’s not reality in today. It
needs to be something different for AOR.
They said that there are authorities to deviate or to go beyond 750,000, you just have
to exercise them. And one thing we’re looking at doing this year, although it has not
been approved, but it could be, is reprogram some money. And there’s a formal
reprogramming process in which you can take MILCON funds, or dollars, and you
can reprogram them into other accounts. One account is the P341 account.

Increase MILCON 1
limit in AOR

O-6

24 Support
Officer

Reprogramming
MILCON funds

6

O-4

11 Civil Engineer Pentagon USAF

DC

quite frankly the MILCON levels has to go up in the contingency environment.
that’s gonna need some type of legislation that sets a different set of rules for the
contingency operations.
– this is an issue that’s going to have to be fixed from on high. It’s got to be –
Congress has got to be in the loop on this. They’ve got to understand
maybe we can get CCA in a more expedited way.

Increase MILCON 2
limit in AOR

O-5

19 Army Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

Communication 3
with Congress
Decrease time for 3
CCA
Increase MILCON 4
limit in AOR

O-4

12 Attorney

O-4

12 Attorney

O-6

34 Engineer

Embassy/ USAF
Corps
Embassy/ USAF
Corps
Corps
Army

Afghanistan/
Iraq
Afghanistan/
Iraq
Iraq

number one is for emergency operations, they need to increase the MILCON
threshold. That’s probably the number one item that needs to be changed and it
needs to be changed to a minimum of $5 million in my opinion.

Table 13: Analysis of Question 8
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ID Rank Yr Occupation Level
Group

Service AOR
USAF

Afghanistan

Question 8 (Continued)
“Do you have any solutions you would recommend regarding contingency construction?”
Response

Remarks

I’m not gonna say eliminate any of the hurdles that you gotta go
through. It’s gotta go to CENTCOM, I don’t see any way around that.
It’s gotta go to ARCENT. They were always very good. It’s gotta go to
OSD, I got it, but perhaps they should give authority perhaps as one of

Secretary of
Defense has the
authority to grant
approval and

ID Rank Yr. Occupat Level
i
4 O-6
34 Engineer
Corps

Service AOR
Army

Iraq

79

better synchronization between the corps of engineers and the MNCI C7 Communication 4
shop too. I don't know how to do that but I wouldn’t think it would be and cooperation
too hard if you think about it a little bit. But all the times they had
between agencies
technical knowledge on these, yet we were not talking as much as we

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

All those reasons count against temporary construction. And maybe it’s
is it a definitional problem? Yes. I think if this were presented to
Congress, and every Congressman that ever came through when we
presented it to em and I presented it personally in most cases, it was to
them it was a no-brainer. They go ah, this is obvious. But whenever
they went back it was dead on arrival. It never, far as I’m concerned it
fell on deaf ears
“Well, should it be 750K times an area of cost factor?

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

24

Group

USAF

Afghanistan

O-6

28

Civil
Engineer
Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Definitional
4
problem
(temporary
construction),
congressman
didn't follow up
on issues
MILCON limit w/ 7
area cost factor
8
What we need is the regulation – the regulation needs to read one way in Contingency
peace time, and another way in – there’s gotta be a peace time regulation Regulations
and a contingency regulation.It should be the same regulation, but with a
little table. The table says, “This is what we do in this particular
situation, and this is what we do in this other type of situation.”

Congress needs to be made aware of the impacts of the law. I don't
know if they are.

Communication
with Congress

Table 14: Analysis of Question 8 (Continued)
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4

Question 8 (Continued)
“Do you have any solutions you would recommend regarding contingency construction?”
Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

the CCA process itself, I think the best methodology is to having the
right people on the ground theater to be able to properly justify and work
in within the system. Our technique of rotating people in and out simply
puts us at a disadvantage because it’s relearn process of return. consider
select personnel doing 2-year tours and very – and I’m not talking these
guys are not kicking in doors, these guys are working out of an
office.And I’m talking for senior personnel

4
Get the right
people involved in
the process,
continuity

was a proposal was made by AFFSC. They said, “Look how about rather Lower approval
than having to go through this laborious approval process, why don’t you authority
delegate approval authority to us, or rather to CENTCOM or COCOM,
to the Combatant Commander?”

80

“Could the Resource Sponsors give up some of their resources to the
COCOMs?” So the four-star level discussions about this, they were
mostly held at Scott Air Force Base a few years ago.But the bottom line
still remains, and this is a big hurdle to cross, is that the Resource
Sponsors just don’t want to give up control
you know, if your premise is to create – is to come up with some new
alternatives, could one say that the Service component could advocate
specifically for fixed funding specifically for the COCOM, in order to,
say, execute a CCA program, if you were given that authority? I think
that could happen. That could happen if you were to advocate through
the given Service component that way. And that might be an
alternative.So, in that case, then you delegate the authority to the
Combatant Commander. You provide him with the ability to provide
congressional notification himself, or herself, or their selves. And then
they have fixed resources through the Service components in the way
that they POM, and then he were able to reach out and cap those
resources as needed.

O-6

34 Engineer

Corps

Service AOR

Theme

Army

Iraq

Get the right
people involved
in the process,
continuity (34)

Delegate
authority to
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authority
(Pentagon/ DC)
Delegate
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(Pentagon/ DC)
Delegate
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(Pentagon/ DC)
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notification
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Table 15: Analysis of Question 8 (Continued)
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DC

Question 8 (Continued)
“Do you have any solutions you would recommend regarding contingency construction?”
Response

Remarks

ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

the most dramatic proposal that came out of that Winchester Conference
was that we see if we can delegate approval authority to the COCOM. A
less dramatic suggestion was could we speed up our internal Air Force
coord. on these packages.... **** would want me to advertise this, but
it’s absolutely true is that every Service has its own paradigms on how it
does things. Some Services do some things one way, and some do the
other. And there’s nothing close hold or classified about what I’m about
to tell you, but it is an Air Force issue.... we are the only Service that
requires our congressional notification packages go from two different
organizations to two different sets of committees. ... And it could do
that, and, in fact, that’s how they do it – that’s how they operate on the
Army’s side of these things. Installation Environment function sends it
out to all the committees and has less coordination responsibility, or it
takes less time,

Delegate approval 5
authority to the
COCOM,
reengineer the
approval process

81

Table 16: Analysis of Question 8 (Continued)
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Service AOR

Pentagon Civil
Service

DC

Theme
Delegate
authority to
COCOM, lower
authority
Pentagon/ DC)

Emergent Concepts

82

Emergent Concepts - Response

Remarks

Anytime, you know, when it comes to money like that, anytime you do it
in house, you don’t have to count the manpower against it, right? So if
you did a contract, you would bump up against, and you would get less
concrete for the money
When I first arrived, Afghanistan was not the priority like it is now.
And so we weren’t getting type of CCA funding at all.
it’s all political when it comes down – when comes right down to it
because I’m sure you saw when you were in Iran – Iraq, there are a lot of
projects that get a lot scrutiny from Congress because they show –they
are indicators of long-term presence.
It cost about $10 million to build a barebones battalion-sized FOB with,
... So we tried to go through and get CCA through ARCENT and
CENTCOM. Wouldn’t do it, and so – because of the, you know,
soreness of it that, you know, you're ******. So what happened is they
came CENTCOM and ARCENT, mainly – ARCENT came back and
said, “Well just divide it up, you know, you can split it up.” Well the
problem we ran into then is our lawyer – our fiscal lawyer, and our GE,
our money guy, felt immediately that was project splitting ... And then
we would go back, you know, I’m going to build the perimeter. I’m
going to build this road. I’m going to build that road. And so we got
into a legal Catch-22 where we could not get the lawyers to sign off and
agree that it wasn’t project splitting at that the multiple projects that were
in fact, legal and sufficient. We messed around – there’s literally, you
know, it’s like a three-star level were the lawyer at ARCENT had to
write and opinion and they said we could do it, which Bagram. That was
a very eye opening experience for me. the limitations of using CCA.

Troop Labor

ID Rank Yr. Occupat Level
i
1 O-6
24 Support
Group

Service AOR
USAF

Afghanistan

Officer

No CCA for
2
Afghanistan
Political issues 2
with "long term
presence"

O-5

19

O-5
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Upper level
2
Command
encouraging
project splitting

O-5

19

Table 17: Emergent Concepts
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Army
Officer
Army
Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

Army
Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan

ID Rank Yr. Occupat Level
i
Our first one was not a fiscal lawyer and did not understand. And it was Lawyers need to 2 O-5
19 Army
Corps

83

Emergent Concepts - Response

Remarks

really, you know, the first that they’d ever worked at it. And so we – it
was extremely painful trying to get project pushed through. Our second
lawyer came in – was in fact a fiscal lawyer –and really, you know, he
understand, “Okay, this is not legal, but this is what we can do to make it
legal." So he would give suggestions. The first lawyer would say, “No,
you can’t do that.” And then wouldn’t give us any help on how to craft
the projects folder.
And then here’s a quote that you can use. There was a – one of the
Brigade Commanders, the ****** said – he said – I said “I can have an
E5 call in over a million dollars worth of bombs and no one asks a
question, but if I spend $750,000.01, then I am in trouble, and I can’t
build anything.”
there was a big division between those who – who were trying to get
things done, you know, don’t stop the mission, and those who wanted to
do it right under the law.I was told, you know, “Marines are gonna die
because you are stalling this process.”
LOGCAP has completely overreached everything it was intended to do
because it’s easy. It’s easy to contract somebody there. I went to all the
LOGCAP meetings and, you know, they would just run through a variety
of projects that were being requested and, “Yep we can support this,”
because they would have contractors of LOGCAP sitting right there,
“Yeah we can do that.” “We can do this.” “We can do that.” And there
was no telling, you know, how much fraud waste and abuse that went on

help by
providing
solutions

Service AOR
Army

Afghanistan

Officer

2

O-5

19

Army
Officer

Corps

Army

Afghanistan
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Table 18: Emergent Concepts (Continued)
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Emergent Concepts - Response

Remarks

When we were getting down to the nuts and bolts of that building and
saying, you know, we need more money under the MILCON to make this
thing work, we were told by Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the
Air Force, whoever it was that was, you know, providing us that money,
“No we will not go back to Congress and ask for more money. You are
stuck with $50 million,” or however much it was.
and I’m not even a contracts person. I – you know, I’m more of a
litigation/military justice person. But it – the litigation – contract
litigation wants as a litigator, but not as a contract specialist. So they
saw that I’d done contract litigation, which I knew some, but not very
much on, and they assumed that I must be an expert ______________.
And I was like, “Ah, this is crazy stuff.”

Communication
with Congress

3
Lawyers didn't
have skills needed

/Corps

Iraq

O-4

12

Attorney

Embassy USAF
/Corps

Afghanistan/
Iraq

4

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

4

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Need to improve 4
CCA approval
process,
disconnected
leadership outside
theater

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

General Pertrarus to the Secretary of Defense I believe, bringing up the
issue of funding and CCA and project/program issues. General Casey
had done the same thing. His predecessor had also written about it

84

CCA is identified
as a problem by
top combatant
commanders
CCA is really designed to grant authority for projects for where we have No CCA for
no intent for long-term occupation of an area. Where in Afghanistan, that Afghanistan
is in fact the plan and that’s prohibited a lot of it in Afghanistan.
And there were the questions that came back once you got to the OSD
level were really – and the questions were frequently answered at
CENTCOM level but sometimes they were passed down to us and they
were quite frankly stupid questions in my opinion. A lot of – you could
tell that it was people who were unfamiliar with – and I stay stupid,
that’s really misleading, they’re uninformed questions. They were
questions like why do you need this and yet there was a requirement of
the submission is to explain the need. And they were questions you
could clearly see that they did not have any level of fundamental
understanding of a combat situation in Iraq. And you would have to
answer those questions.

ID Rank Yr. Occupat Level Service AOR
i
3 O-4
12 Attorney
Embassy USAF
Afghanistan/

Table 19: Emergent Concepts (Continued)
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Emergent Concepts - Response

85

So the restrictiveness of the law does two things, one, in my opinion it
goes against the intent of Congress to do it in a cheaper, faster mode. It
actually does it in a slower and more expensive mode number
one.Number two, CMU, and you know this, it’s obviously a far better
force protection measure than a CHU.
We were told to stop doing it because of this authority. We were
misreading it. We were calling these concrete missionary units
temporary and they said that’s not temporary. We were stretching the
law I think at that time even though we did have JAG concurrence
I think part of that is because you have personnel rotating in and out and
you don’t have a long-term view and that happens. And quite frankly we
don’t – once these projects are built, we don’t track em. We’re not
sending inspectors out three years later to say hey, did you do anything to
this. And should we be doing that from a legal standpoint? Yes. But
from a realistic war-fighter standpoint, no. And did not – we simply
didn’t have the personnel resources to do it. We didn’t have the
personnel resources to even inspect adequately as they were being built,
which is a whole
Again, I don’t remember, I wanna say $500 million; I don’t remember
what it was. It’s easy to bump up against that ceiling on CCA authority.
CCA if you take 6 to 9 months to get approved, now most of the
requirement in that amount of time hasn’t changed over time and that
frequently occurred where you had an increase in the requirement in that
window of time.You could not change the requirement once it was
submitted
Our technique of rotating people in and out simply puts us at a
disadvantage because it’s relearn process of return. consider select
personnel doing 2-year tours and very – and I’m not talking these guys
are not kicking in doors, these guys are working out of an office.And I’m
talking for senior personnel

Remarks

ID Rank Yr. Occupat Level
i
34 Engineer
Corps
Law is not meeting 4 O-6
its intent, Cost
RLB vs. CMU,
definitional
problem
4
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problem with
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Construction
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CCA appropriation 4
is too low
CCA is too slow 4
and requirements
change frequently
during contingency
operations
Continuity
4
Problems

Table 20: Emergent Concepts (Continued)
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Service AOR
Army

Iraq

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

O-6

34

Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

Emergent Concepts - Response

Remarks

86

. In July, we met with OSD Comptroller ourselves, and we had reps of SAF/FM there. People are
AFFSC was there. CENTCOM was there. And this is in Winchester, Virginia, at
working to fix
Army Corps of Engineers – the Middle East District – Middle East District.And as
problem,
******** says, the premise of our meeting was to streamline, based on guidance from Winchester,
General Petraeus.So, upon his departure from MNF-I, General Petraeus sent the
Virginia, General
Deputy Under Security of Defense a memorandum that stated that he felt that even if Petraeus sent the
CCA – some of the MILCON and CCA programs were still too cumbersome in order Deputy Under
to meet the dynamic requirements of the war fighter in theater, given the fact that
Security of
you’re fighting an enemy who really doesn’t care how long your political processes
Defense
and your approval processes take to get something moved through the system and
approved.
When I was there, there was no CCA going on.And I don’t know if there was a
No CCA for
moratorium on it, but there was no CCA going on, at least at Bagram. And if any CCA Afghanistan, lack
was going on, it would have had to have been done out of FOB.So, really, if it wasn’t of options
done with relocatable buildings, then it would have taken three to five years, a long,
long time.Right.And that really wasn’t an option to wait that long.Right, exactly.
The more people you get writing on that, the more research on that, _________
Encouraging
hopefully we foster change in Congress, and even below.
Change
Sir, I think that’s an interesting point that you brought up, and that is using troop labor PBD 720
as a means by which we can somewhat circumvent those funding thresholds because Considerationthe labor is not counted against the construction cost. And as I understand it, and you Troop Labor and
funding limits
please fill me in, ‘cause I’m sure I’m not as familiar with it as you are, but it’s my
understanding that the Army got rid of a lot of their construction capabilities I think in
the '90s, possibly. And part of that analysis involved saying that contractors can do
everything that active duty military can do, or Reserves. But in fact, that might not be
the case in a contingency environment, because contractors, all their labor costs go
against the construction limit. But troop labor does not. So, it seems like that may not
have been an accurate assessment back when they did that analysis.That is a true
statement....because of that fact, the use of troops...should be the first – because of all
the other restrictions because of contingency and military struction restrictions, ... to
expedite those projects, and that may or may not affect the commander’s flexibility in th
cca but I believe it was out of Kosovo, and the Army had come up with an opinion – in Origin of CCAother words to use O&M funds to construct for immediate construction, for like bare Kosovo
base facilities in a contingency environment.

Table 21: Emergent Concepts (Continued)
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ID Rank Yr Occupation Level

Service AOR

6

O-4

11 Civil Engineer Pentagon

USAF

DC

7

O-6

24 Civil Engineer Group

USAF

Afghanistan

8

O-6

28 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

8

O-6

28 Engineer

Corps

Army

Iraq

9

O-4

14 JAG

Joint
Contracting
Command

USAF

Afghanistan/
Iraq
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